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Abstract 
The Player project i1:1 an open-1:1ource effort providing a control interface specification ~Uld 
soft:ware framework for abstracting robot hardware. This research presents five exploits that 
compromise vulnerabilities in Player's command and control protocol. The attacks exploit 
\veaknesses in the ARP, IP, TCP and Player protocols to compromise the confidentiall:y, 
integrity, and availability of communication betvveen a Pla,yer client and server. The attacks 
as1:1ume a laptop i1:1 connected in promiscuou1:1 mode to the same Ethernet hub a1:1 the client and 
server in order to sniff all network traffic between them. Thi1:1 work also demonstrates that 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is capable of mitigating the vulnerabilities discovered in 
Player's cormnand and control protocol. Experimental results show that all five exploits are 
successful vvhen Player communication is unprotected but are defeated when IPsec 
Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Securit:v Protocol (ESP) arc deployed together 
(AH-ESP) in tran1:1port mode. A cost function is defined to 1:1ynthcsize three distinct scalar 
costs (exploit success, ere utilization, and network load) into a single scalar output that can be 
used to compare the different defense protocols provided by IPsec. Results from this cost 
function shovv that in a scenario >vhen exploits are likely, IPsec AH ESP is the preferred 
defense protocol becau1:1c of its relatively low CPU and network overhead and ability to defeat 
the exploits implemented in this research by authenticating and encrypting the tran1:1port and 
application layers. Performance data reveals that for the Overo Earth embedded system 
running a TI OiviAP:3i5::W processor at 720~1Hz, IPsec AH+ESP increases CPU utilization by 
0.52% and the network load by 22.9Kbps (64.:3% increase). 
iv 
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VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PLAYER COMMAND AND 
CONTROL PROTOCOL 
I. Introduction 
Remotely piloted vehicles have transformed the -vvay the C.S. military conducts 
operations. The advantages of such systems to perform dull, dirty, or dangerous missions are 
also being realized in the civilian sector. For these systems to consistently perform at their 
maximum potential, security must be considered when designing the communication protocols 
that define how these systems arc remotcl:v controlled. lf compromised, these s:vstems could 
lead to the loss of confidential inf()rrnation or the loss of control of the system. In the worst-
case, the cormnand and control system could be completely taken over by a malicious adversary, 
which could lead to the loss of technology or life. Because of these potential consequences, 
analysis of the sccurit:v of the communication protocols used to remotely pilot vehicles is vital. 
Player is an open-source command and control application that provides interfaces to 
remotely control and read sensor data from a mobile robot lGSVOOj. Because it is open-source 
and \videl:y used in the academic realm, it is an appropriate candidate f()r studying the security 
of command and control protocols of remotely piloted vehicles. Furthermore, the Player 
community has not published -vvorks discussing the security of Player. thus there is a need for 
work in this area. 
1.1 Objectives 
This thesis focuses on one part of the overall security concerns for remotely piloted 
vehides: vulnerability analysis of Player's connnand and control protocol. The research goals of 
this thesis are: 
l) Demonstrate the vulnerability of the Player protocol to network attacks; 
2) Demonstrate the effectiveness of lPsec to secure the Player protocol; 
1 
 J) Quantify the cost of IPsec to secure the Player protocol. 
It is hypothesiz:ed that vulnerabilities in Player's command and control protocol -vvill be 
discovered that allow exploits to compromise communication. Additionally, it is expected that 
IPsec will mitigate these vulnerabilities and allow for secure Player connnand and control. 
Finally, it is hypothesized that the system will consume additional resources when employing 
IPsec but that the system will maintain proper functionality. 
1.2 Implications 
By analyzing Pla:vcr's '.rulnerabilit:v to attack, the community is made aware of any 
discovered weaknesses in the Player protocol and possible countermeasures that ensure secure 
deployment. The methodology outlined in this thesis can be used to anal:yze the securit:y of 
other Player-like command and control applications. Because there is concern that mobile 
devices do not possess the necessary resources to protect communication, this research 
determines if modern mobile devices have sufficient resources to protect Player-like command 
and control with lPsec. 
1. 3 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2 provides a literature revievv of network security for client-server applications 
and a detailed description of the Player application. Related works in the field of performance 
analysis of security protocols arc also included. Chapter 3 defines the research goals of this 
thesis and the methodology used to accomplish these goals. Chapter 4 presents the results and 
analysis of the data collected in this thesis. Finally, Chapter i5 concludes by summarizing the 
results and significance of this work and identifying areas for fi1ture work. 
2 
II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a review of the foundational literature for the research detailed in 
this thesis. The reader should be familiar with computer networking and the Internet stack. 
The concepts described in this chapter are implemented and extended in this thesis to 
accomplish the research goals. 
Section 2.2 defines network security and the security model used in this thesis. Section 
2.:3 provides background into the current mechanisms used to secure client-server applications. 
Section 2.4 describes the Player project a.nd the protocol it uses to communicate. Section 2.5 
details the architecture of the physical robotic platform selected for this research. Section 2.6 
revievvs published netvvork attacks against client-server applications as well as techniques that 
have been developed to mitigate these attacks. Section 2. 7 discusses the results from works 
related to the field of mobile security. Section 2.8 details the nuvclt:v of this research, and 
Section 2.9 provides a summary of this chapter. 
2.2 Network Security Fundamentals 
This section defines the term network security within the context of this thesis. The 
cryptographic community often uses the variable names Alice and I3ob to represent tvvo parties 
who wish to communicate securely. Because security is difficult to define without an adversary 
\vith ill intent, the community uses the character, Eve (short for eavesdrop), to represent an 
adversar:y who can read all messages that Alice and Bob comnmnicate to each other. The 
malicious character, .Mallory, is not only capable of reading all messages communicated between 
Alice and Bob, but can additionally modify these messages, replay old messages, or create new 
messages. This illustration casts network security as the scenario in which Alice and I3ob vvish 
to communicate securely even in the presence of 1-Iallory. Figure 1 depicts an example scenario 
“Hi, I’m Alice.”
“Hi, I’m Bob.”
Alice BobMallory
“Hi, I’m Bob.”
“Hi, I’m Alice.”
protocols protect client-server applications is crucial to the selection of a subset of these 
defensive protocols for study in Chapter :3. 
2.8.1 Client-Server Arcl1itccturc. The client-server arcl1itecture leverages cooperative 
processing capabilities through the use of netvwrks to split the processing performed by the 
client and the server, while still presenting a single logical service to the user. A server is a 
process that exists to provide services to one or more clients [GuT95]. A client is a process that 
requests and receives information hom a server. Servers do not initiate contact with clients but 
instead listen for requests from clients. Once a client makes a request, the server processes and 
services the request. \Vhcn the data is returned to the client, the client operates on the data 
and presents it to the application, which may include a graphical user interface (GUl) for user 
interaction [GuT9i5]. ::viobile client-server computing is an extension of this architecture for 
mobile environments. vVhat distinguishes it from classical, fixed-connection, computing is the 
fact that clients can change locations and typically have higher resource constraints [.THE991. 
2.3.2 Security at the Applica..tion Layer. Pretty Good Privac.Y (PCP) provides 
cryptographic confidentiality and authentication for data files and email messages [Cal07j. 
Confidentiality is provided using a combination of public-key and synnnetric-ke:;,r encr:yption in 
;vhich symmetric session keys are generated using public-key material. Authentication is 
handled differently in PCP than in other Public Key Infrastructures (PKI). Rather than a top-
down certificate authority, used in SSL, PGP uses a bottom-up ll/cb of trust model. ln this 
model, users exchange and accumulate keys with other users they designate as trusted entities 
[Cal07j. Keys signed by trusted entities or signed by multiple partially trusted entities arc 
deemed legitimate. Keys signed by unknown entities or by a single partially trusted entity arc 
not deemed legitimate. By using a decentralized approach, PGP has the advantage of being 
resilient to single-node failure but scales poorly r C erOO 1-
Secure Shell (SSH) is a security protocol that creates an authenticated, encrypted 
channel between two networked systems. SSH is built on a client-server architecture for which 
the server is responsible for accepting or rejecting incoming connections to the host system. 
1: sers run SSH client programs to authenticate with, and make requests of, the SSH server 
[OpeOD]. SSH provides authentication, encryption, and integrity through a variety of encryption 
algorithms, hashing algorithms, and authentication options. SSH differs from PGP in that PGP 
typically secures a single file or email at a time, vvhile SSH secures an ongoing session rnSI30i"i]. 
Secure Soclcets Layer (SSL) was developed by ~etscape Communication Corporation to 
provide security and prilracy to Internet communication [Ilsall j. \Vhile the protocol is 
application-independent, it is optimized for HTTP. SSL provides encr:vption, client-server 
authentication, and message authentication codes (11AC) at the application layer. The SSL 
handshake is made up of a server authentication phase and an optional client authentication 
phase. The most recent implementation of SSL is Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 1.2. 
TLS 1.2 adds support for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as well as the Secure Hash 
Algorithm 2 (SHA-2) family. Rather than the bottom-up model used in PGP, SSL employs a 
top-down certificate authority (CA) to authenticate clients and servers. A certificate authority 
is a trusted third party that issues digital certificates that bind a name to a public-key rDie08]. 
2.3.3 Security at the Transport La,Yer. There are currently no widely-adopted security 
protocols deployed for the transport layer of the Internet stack. Obfuscated TCP (ObsTCP) 1s 
a rejected draft for the Internet Engineering Ta.':ik Force (lETF) that proposed opportunistic 
encryption at the transport layer. Encryption in ObsTCP is opportunistic because if either side 
docs not support 0 bsTCP, the connection falls back to normal, unencrypted TCP. ln 
comparison to SSL, ObsTCP is designed to provide faster encryption without protection from a 
man-in-the-middle (\UTN[) attack. Because it operates at the transport layer, any application 
6 
layer protocol ca.n utilize ObsTCP without modification. After the IETF rejected the proposal, 
the draft was removed from the lETF and development of the project ceased [Obf12j. 
TcpCiypt is a reccntl:y proposed tnlllsport la:yer securit:y protocol that provides 
opportunistic encryption and optional authentication. It is similar to the failed ObsTCP IETF 
draJt except that it also provides hooks f(n· applications to provide authentication, ·which protect 
against l\UTl'vi attacks. Because tcpcrypt operates in the transport layer, it has the advantage 
over application la:;,rer security protocols that it can authenticate the TCP header and be used to 
protect any application with less modification rnHHlO]. Tcpcrypt is currently under 
development by a group of researchers at Stanford University, lead by Andrea Bit tau [Bit12j. 
The lETF is currently reviewing a draft of the tcpcr:vpt protocol [BBHllj. 
2.3.4 Security at tile .Network Layer. Internet rmtocol Secmity (IPsec) is a network 
layer security protocol designed to mitigate many of the security weaknesses inherent to the 
fnternet Protocol (IP). These vvealmesses are used in practice to perform IP spoofing, session 
hijacking, man-in-the-middle (1UTl\I), and denial of service (DoS) attacks. IPsec is designed to 
complement upper-layer protocols (e.g., TCP) such that they do not h<rve to be modified in 
order to employ its protections. Securit:y associations (SA) are used by IPsec to define the 
security parameters that allow two hosts to comnmnicate securely. A SA is uniquely identified 
by an IP destination address, Security Parameter Index (SPI) . and a security protocol rKim07]. 
As shown in Figure 2, IPsec operates in two modes: transport and tunnel. In transport 
mode, only the payload (typically a TCP segment) is protected. In tunnel mode, the entire IP 
datagram is protected and encapsulated in a. ne>v IP packet. Tunnel mode is often used to 
create virtual private networks (VPK). 
7 
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2.4 Player Project 
This section describes the purpose and implementation of Player, the command and 
control application studied in this research. Development of the experiments detailed in 
Chapter ;) relies heavily on a thorough understanding of hovv Player functions and 
communicates. 
2.4.1 Player. The Player project is an open-source effort providing a control interface 
specification ~Uld software framework for abstracting robot hardware. The project name derives 
from Shakespeare's As You Like it: "All the world's a stage, And all the men and women merely 
playenf' [GSVOO]. Player provides simple and complete control over the physical sem:;ors and 
actuators of a mobile agent. Player can handle virtually any number of clients allowing for a 
netvvork of robots to communicate and cooperate. It is vvritten to be language and platform 
independent, though client plug-ins currentl:v only exist for C++, .Java. and Python. 
Player is designed a.':i a. client-server architecture in which robots running Player server 
receive connnands and send status information to controlling Player clients. Robots that 
participate in the cormnand and control of other robots can accomplish this by running both a 
Player client and a Player server locally. An example scenario vvhere multiple Player clients 
and servers arc used is shown in Figure 5 lGVSOl j. ln this scenario, Pla:ver servers (P) running 
on robots ~Uld other sensing devices send data to Player clients (C) that map, log, and 
graphically display this data. Certain robots run Player clients locally, allowing them to process 
data from other servers to make determinations about their surroundings. 
11 
Mapping Computer 
Vision system 
~ -------- --------------~ 
-: :hl;.;;~~~~~:::,7 -
(
ooC ------~obot ~ 
"'-· ___ -_-_-::_-.::::_.:.-:) l__()J Robot 
0 
Data logging server Robot GUI & Debugging workstation 
Figure 5. Scenario of Networked Player Servers (P) and Clients (C) [GVS011 
A Player server listens on TCP port 6665 for incoming client connections [GSVOO]. The 
server provides interfaces to clients through a series of abstractions depicted in F igure 6. 
Available interfaces depend on the hardware that is present in the robot and include services for 
controlling two-dimensional (2D) position and robot peripherals such as sonar or grippers. 
Clients subscribe to one or more of these interfaces, allowing them to issue cornrnands to and 
receive dat a from the robot. 
[ Your Code ] 
ROBO 
T 
T 
• [ Proxies I Player 
l Server 
[ Drivers I 
'I' 
l 
[ Hardware J 
Figure 6. Player Server Architecture [Owc101 
2.4.2 Stage. Stage is a 2D robot simulation environment built to interface with Player 
and demonstrate robot behavior. The project name is also derived from the same line in 
Shakespeare's As You Like It [GSVOO]. Stage virtualizes the physical robot from Player (Figure 
7) so that a Player robot can he studied in a simulated environment. It interfaces with Player 
12 
  
the same way a physical rouot docs uy receiving cornuwuds and moving a simulated robot. The 
si rn ula ted robot. passes sensor data. back from i t.s vi rt. ual en vi I'On men l t.o t.he Player· eli en L 
Figme 7. Stage Architecture IOweH>I 
2.4.3 Player Network Protocol. The Player protocol defines how messages between the 
dicut and server arc formatted in order to ~1c:ccss the interfaces that Player supports. 
Underst.anding the prot.oc:ol is dif'l'icult. because t.hc documerlt.at.ion on the o!Tidal website is both 
outtbtcd and incomplete. The official manual states: "Todo: -More verbose documcutation Oil 
tl1 is libra.r,y; including t.he protocol" IPia.1·11. Rcca.usc tl1c prot.oc:ol details are essential t.o this 
re~e~:mJr, the following sections outline a design recovery of the Pl~:wer protocol uf.led in va.0.2. 
2. /1.3.1 XDH. PJayor usos dw IETF !';Lnnda.rd: ExtH'IHl.J Da\.;1 Repm<'lonta.Uon 
(XDTl); to encode messages that arc passed bctwec~n the elic11t and server. XDR is well-
documerned so underst.anding lhe encoding or a message is stra.ight.l'orward once the undcr·lying 
structures have been determined. All data types an-\ encooed using ~1-byte alignment (e.g.; 8-bit 
charact.cr·s arc padded t.o fit a 4-byt.e cell) a.nd tmnsmitted in net work order (big-end ia.n) 
[FreOO]. Af-l a.n exi'l.mpJe; the encoding for l.he IEEE 1'\ingJe-predsion fJoaLing point. number i1'\ 
pictured iu Figure 8. 
byte 0 byte 1 byte 2 byte 3
s exp fractional
1 8 bits 23 bits
32 bits
        
2.4.3.3 Player Message Payload. For messages that include commands or data, 
Player appends a variable-length payload, which is identified in the header. These payloads are 
also XDR-encoded and defined by the interface they represent (e.g., Position2D). Table 2 shows 
an example payload for a Position2D command. The first six XDR cells (vx, vy, va) encode the 
velocity commands as double precision floating point values. The final XDR cell (state) 
specifies the motor state (on, off). 
Table 2. Example Player Command Payload 
4-byte XDR cells Type Name Value Description 
1\ 'U ~ 00 00 00 00 I s ::0 :>, 
u ~ double vx 0.0000 velocity on the X-axis 'U 
I 
'U 
~ 00 00 00 00 0 C'1 ,..D 'U 00 
C'1 0 ::0 00 00 00 00 <ll >=1 0.. +' double 0.0000 velocity on theY-axis :>, 0.....-< I ~ vy 
,..D ·- <ll .... +' > ~ 00 00 00 00 I "[j) <ll 00 :>, 
~ C'1 0 ell BF FO C1 52 0.. ........ ::0 II I 0.. double -1.0272 angular velocity ;.... ~ va t- <ll ~ 38 2D 73 65 * :>, ""'::!' ell 
I 0, +' 00 00 00 01 uint8 t state 1 motor state v .S 
2.5 iRobot Create Platform 
The iRobot Create is an educational robot platform designed for educators, students, 
and developers [Iro11]. iRobot provides an interface specification that allows developers to send 
commands to robot motors and read data from sensors onboard the Create. Player server 
includes a driver that implements this interface specification. In Figure 9, a Player client 
connects via WIFI to the Player server that is executed on the Overo Earth embedded system. 
The server translates the client commands through the Create driver and transmits them via an 
RS232 serial connection to the Create microcontroller. The Create microcontroller performs the 
hardware level control and returns requested data to the Player server, which forwards it back 
to the client. 
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share encryption and decryption keys. \Jodern examples include the Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). ln public-h\Y algorithms, Bob's 
encryption public-key is available to all parties, but the corresponding decryption private-key is 
knuwn only to Bob. Alice uses Bob's public-key to encrypt her message and only Bob can 
decrypt it because he is the only one with access to the private-key [Tr\V06]. RSA is a modern 
example of a public-key algorithm. 
2.6.2 Attacks on Integrity. Alice and Bob wish to connnunicate while ensuring that they 
are in fact communicating vvith each other (authentication) and that their messages have not 
been altered (data integrit:v). :\Jallor:v can launch a class of attack called address bpoofing, 
described by Heberlein and Bishop, in which 1hllory uses false lP addresses to establish forged 
communication 'vith Bob [HeB96]. 
Another class of integrity compromise is the man-in-the-middle (\IITM) attack, in which 
Alice initiates communication vvith whom she thinks is I3ob, but who is actually 1via.llory. 
Mallory for..vards communication (potentially modified) to and from Alice and I3ob vvho are 
unaware of \Jallory's actions. :\HTM attacks can be achiuved when :\Jallory is on Alice or Bob's 
subnet using an attack called ARr cache poisoning [\VhaOl, Phi07]. In this MITM attack, 
Mallory sends gratuitous ARP responses to remap Alice and Bob's IP addresses to her \IAC 
address. Because of this, Alice and I3ob unlmmvingly send messages meant for each other's 
l\IAC addresses to Mallory's MAC address instead. 
If 1viallory is on the same Ethernet switch as Alice, she can perform another 1vUTM 
attack called port stealing rorV0:3]. In this attack, \Iallory floods her mvn Ethernet port with 
packets containing the \IAC address of the gateway router. \Vhen Alice sends a message to her 
gatev.my router, the switch will incorrectly forward it to 1ifallory instead because the s'vitch 
associates the gatev.my router's :\,fAC address with Mallory's Ethernet port. 
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TCP connection llijacldng is an active 1\UT:v£ attack that exploits TCP sequence 
numbers to gain control of an ongoing TCP connection [Jon95j. ln this attack, :Vfallory creates 
a dcsynchroni7:ed state between Alice and Bob's sequence numbers, preventing them from 
exchanging data directly. :VIallory captures the corrupt messages to maliciously modify the 
application layer and then corrects the sequence nmnbers so Alice and Bob will accept the 
modifications. .Joncheray proposes two methods for creating the desynchronized state, early 
desynchroniza.tion and null data. desynchronization p on9Fi1. Early des_)rnchronbmtion is achieved 
>vhen lVlallory resets Alice and I3ob's initial TCP connection and then quickly establishes a. new· 
malicious connection with one of them. :'-l'ull data dcsynchroni7:a.tion involves lVIallor:v watching 
an ongoing TCP connection and then injecting a large amount of null data with correctly 
calculated next sequence numbers. One negative side effect of TCP connection hijacking is that 
it generates an ACK storm >vhen the connection becomes flooded with desynchronized ACK 
packets. The ACK storm can potentially ovenvhelm the attacker's ability to capture and 
retransmit packets. 
The MlT:\;1 attacks described above can be mitigated b:v authenticating the messages 
Alice and Bob send to one another. Hasl1 fiwctions map a large variable-length collection of 
messages into a small fixed-length set of message digests. These are typically used for error 
detection. A cryptographic ha.sh function provides authentication in addition to integrity 
through the usc of public-key cryptograph:v. Alice first hashes her message to produce a. 
message digest, then encrypts the digest with her private-key to produce a digital signature 
l BSP95j. 1\Jcss<Jgc <Hl tlwn tic<J tion codes (MAC) work similarly to cryptographic hash functions 
except that rather than using public-key cryptography, Alice's message digest is encrypted with 
a syrnrnetric-key she shares with Bob [KuRHla]. 
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I3y capturing and storing messages sent bet-vveen Alice and I3ob) l\:Iallory can launch a 
third cla1:11:1 of integrity attack: the rcpla,y <Jttack. ln thi1:1 attack, :'viallory replay1:1 old messages 
which she might not even be able to decipher because of encryption or modify because of 
authentication protection [KuRlO]. By replaying a message, l'viallory could impersonate Alice 
and compel Bob to repeat some action, resulting in negative consequences. 1; sing a timestamp, 
nonce (one time use number), or sequence number as input to a. cryptographic hash function 
defeats replay attacks rKuRlOa1. 
2.(). 3 Attacks on A va.ilability. Alice and I3ob wish to have the ability to communicate 
when needed. Iviallory can launch a clas1:1 of attacks called denial-of-service (DoS) to disrupt 
Alice and Bob's abilit:v to communicate effectively. ~viallor:v achiuves this effect by sending 
messages to Bob that interfere ;vith his normal operation. Typically this means sending a vast 
number of messages to overload I3ob's resources or the net>vork infrastructure that he uses to 
communicate. A distributed-denial-of-sen-ice (DDoS) attack >vorks in the same way, except 
l\Iallory coordinates man}'' attacking machines to amplify the re1:11llting damage l\IDil05j. 
SYN flooding i1:1 a specific DoS attack in which ~via.llory create1:1 a large amount of half 
open TCP connections with Bob [Cer98]. Each time a connection is opened, Bob allocates 
resources for it. Since :rvlallory never closes these connections, Bob eventually runs out of 
resources to allocate for ne-vv connections coming from either ::VIallory or Alice. SY~ cookies 
mitigate SYK flooding by using particular choices of initial TCP sequence number1:1 and waiting 
to commit the full amount of resources for a connection until the client has completed the TCP 
handshake lBerllj. 
Mallory exploits the network la:yer with Smmf <Jttacks by 1:1ending a broadcast lCMP 
echo request into a. susceptible network with Bob's address as the return address [Cer98]. The 
Srnurf netvwrk is used to amplify the effect by using rna.ny systems which unwittingly flood Bob 
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'<vith echo replies, disrupting his infrastructure. Chau describes that the first step in defending 
against Smurf attacks is to prevent one's own network from being a Smurf that is used to attack 
other networks. Configure the router to block all outbound packets that indicate a source 
address not contained ·within the routers internal subnet. In addition, disallow incoming 
broadcast IGMP packets [Cha04]. 
TOP connection flooding expands upon the SYN flooding attack by finishing the three-
;va:y TCP handshake. l\hllor:;,r floods Bob with forged TCP SYI\ packets and listens for Bob's 
SY~-ACK response. Iviallory then completes the connection by replying v.rith an ACK using 
Bob's SYN-ACK sequence number. A popular 1rersion of this attack is the HTTP-GET flood 
attack [YlS07j. Because the malicious packets have legitimate TCP headers and HTTP 
payloads, they are difficult to distinguish from legitimate requests and thus more difficult to 
filter out effectively. Yatagai et al. propose behavioral algorithms to detect and deny malicious 
requests that complete the TCP handshake [YIS07]. In another mitigation technique, client 
pu?:zlcs, a server discerns a client's commitment to making a connection by utilizing some of the 
client's resources. A puzzle is defined as a task that is difficult to solve b:v the client but eas:v to 
verif:y by the server. Only aft.er the client returns the solved puzzle will the server allocate 
resources to the connection. For this strategy to be effective, the client must always commit 
more resources than the server [Al\LOl]. 
TCP reset allows Mallor:v to close a live connection between Alice and Bob by injecting 
a spoofed TCP header into their connection with the reset bit set. \Vatson's results show that 
practical attacks arc possible on the order of 10 seconds when the attacker has the capability to 
transmit 4:370 packets per second [\Vat04j. To defeat TCP reset attacks, \Vatson suggests the 
use of the optional TCP :VID5 header to authenticate each packet and its TCP header ;vhich 
contains the reset flag. Jvialicious packets that fail the \IDfi authentication are silently dropped. 
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vVatson also recommends that the TCP >vindmv size be carefully tuned in order to make it as 
small as possible, while still maintaining reliable and timely communication. A smaller TCP 
window size forces the attacker to expend more resources to dose the connection because the 
probability that the reset. packet correctly falls into the window is reduced [\Vat04]. 
2.6.4 Network Attack Tools. To demonstrate exploits that compromise the Player 
protocol, several cormnon networking tools are extended by this research. \Vireshark is a 
network protocol anal:yzer that. allmvs a user to capture and int.eractivel:y browse computer 
netvvork traffic. 13ecause it is >vrit.t.en in C/ C I I , it can be compiled on all popular operating 
systems and supports a large number of protocols out of the box [\Virll j. A custom \Vireshark 
dissector that parses the Player protocol described in Section 2.4.3 is created for this research 
and indnded in Appendix A. 
Scapy is an interactive packet manipulation program developed a..-; a P:ython module. 
The core features it provides are the ability to capture and dissect packets and the ability to 
forge and transmit packets on the >vire. Scapy is designed to handle scanning, trace routing, 
probing, and network attacks. By including hooks to bind new protocols, Sca.py is extendable 
b:y the user [Scall]. Because it is written in Python, Scapy code runs on all popular operating 
systems and supports popular protocols. The Player protocol described in Section 2.4.:5 and the 
netvvork attacks selected in Section :1.9 are implemented in Scapy. 
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2. 'l Related Works 
Caldera et al. extend Ketwork Simulator 2 (KS2) to measure the performance penalties 
of IPsec and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) on the ~VIobile IP protocol [CDJ'\00]. The metrics the 
authors choose are netvvork throughput and delay. Caldera et al. investigate three scenarios 
involving different combinationt1 of AH and ESP in transport and tunnel modet1. :Results show 
that IPsec does not have a significant penalty on throughput relative to the erratic effects 
introduced by the phyt1ical wireless link. Thut1 for t1yt1tems communicating wirclessly, Caldera ct 
al. predict that the performance impacts of lPscc arc negligible. 
Argyroudis et al. investigate the performance impacts of using strong cryptographic 
protocols (SSL and IPsee) on handheld devices [A VT04]. Their platform consists of an HP 
iP AQ H:lG:m with a 206\-IH~ StrongARJV[ processor and :121vm of RAJV[ running vVindmvs CE 
Pocket PC 2002. Ilef-lllltf-1 t1how that both cr:vptogra.phic protocols introduce mea.'mrablc latency 
but a.re realit1tically feasible for securing casual HTTP traffic. However, the authort1 usc 
significantly slower hardware than is connnercially available for similar modern devices, so their 
conclusions may be outdated. 
Elkeela.ny et al. perform analytical studies to estimate the space and time performance 
impacts of IPsec AH and ESP when operating vvith three specific cryptographic algorithms: 
l\ID5, SHA-1, and 3DES lE:\JS02j. ln terms of t;pa.cc complexity, rcsultt1 t1how AH and ESP add 
an additional 24 and 22 bytes respectively to each IP packet. Their results show that for a 
5001\HPS machine MD5 can be performed at MOMbps, SHA-1 at 180Mbps and :~DES at 41\Ibps. 
2.8 Research Contributions 
This research extends work in the area of mobile client-server security. The literature 
produced by the Pla:ycr communit:y docs not consider the sccurit:y of the syf-ltem, an oversight 
this thct1is addrct1t1es. Thit1 research implcmcntt; t1evcra.l well-known network attacks against 
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Player and records the results. Given that robots have clear physical consequences (e.g., safety 
concerns), it is recommended that the Player community consider how the network protocol 
could be designed more securely. The performance analysis cited by Argyroudis et al. in Section 
2. 7 is several years old; this analysis is updated using modern technology here. This research 
not. only quantifies the cost of system resources incurred by IPsec, but also synthesizes this with 
the securit:y cost a..-;sociated ·with an unprotected system. Results are supported \vith measured 
experimental data, >vhich complement previous simulated and calculated >vorks cited in Section 
2. 7 by Caldera et al. and Elkeelany et al. 
2. 9 Literature Review Summary 
This chapter provides the background in network security, security protocols for client-
server applications, the Player project, and net\vork attacks necessary to understand this 
research. The methodology described in Chapter :1 builds upon the works cited in this literature 
review to accomplish the research goals of this thesis. 
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the methodology for analyzing the vulnerability of Player's 
command and control protocol. The experiments described in this chapter provide data to 
ans>ver the research questions of this thesis. Analysis of this data is presented in Chapter 4. 
Section 3.2 defines the research goals of this thesis. Section 3.3 describes the approach 
for accomplishing these research goals. Section 3.4 provides the system boundaries that frame 
the System Cnder Test (SUT). Section :3.5 lists the services that the SUT provides. Section ::Ui 
defines the >vorkload that the SUT performs. Section :3.7 defines the metrics by \vhich the 
performance of the SUT is measured. Section :3.8 defines the system and workload parameters 
in fine detail so that this work can be replicated. Section :3.9 lists the factors that are expected 
to affect system perf<)rmance. Section :3.10 describes the evaluation technique that is used to 
test the research hypotheses. Section :3.11 provides the experimental design for this work. 
Finally) Section :3.12 provides a. summary for the chapter. 
3.2 Research Goals 
The research goals of this thesis are threefold: 
1) Demonstrate the vulnerability of the Player protocol to network attacks; 
2) Demonstrate the effectiveness of IPsec to secure the Player protocol; 
:3) Quantif:v the cost of lPscc to secure the Player protocol. 
I3eca.use the robot is an embedded device) it is resource constrained in both computing 
capabilities and energy storage. ln addition, a mobile robot uses a wireless network to 
communicate, which is inhercntl:y bandwidth-limited. Supposing that lPsec can he shown to be 
effective at protecting Player, the overhead it introduces could exceed the capabilities of some 
robot platforms. Therefore, the cost for research goal ;) is defined as the additional computing, 
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energy) andnet>vork bandwidth resources a robot running Player must expend to protect its 
command and control communication with lPsec. 
This research also determines the performance impact of running lPsec while under 
attack. An important question to consider is which types of connnand and control exploits are 
mitigated by the different IPsec protocols? \Vhat is the performance impact that different IPsec 
protocols and exploits cause? At a tactical level, this research determines the performance cost 
of IPsec to defeat particular exploits, as certain IPsec protocols protect different a..-;peets of the 
CIA security modeL described in Section 2.2. 
It is hypothesized that exploits against confidentiality, integrity, and availability vvill be 
successful in compromising an unprotected Player system. Because lPsec AH authenticates the 
IP payload, it will defeat attacks against integrity that attempt to inject f()rged data. IPsec 
ESP will defeat attacks against confidentiality by encrypting the IP payload, making it 
infeasible for an attack to read the plaintext. I3y both authenticating and encrypting the IP 
payload, IPsec AH ESP will defeat attacks against both integrity and confidentiality. Ko IPsec 
protocol is expected to be cffectilre against availability attacks because lPsec has no mechanism 
to prevent an attacker from consuming shared network resources. "Csing IPsec willmeasurabl:y 
increase the CP"C utilization, energy consumption, and network traffic of the embedded system 
in the robot because of the extra computational steps needed to perform authentication and 
encryption algorithms and the addition of the lPsec network headers. Of the two lPsec 
protocols, AH is expected to consume fewer resources than ESP a.':i Dai finds that with the same 
key size, SHA-2 consumed fewer cycles per byte than AES lDai09j. lPsec AH-ESP is expected 
to consume the most resources because both the AH and ESP protocols arc applied. 
Attacks targeting confidentiality are not expected to affect CPU utilization, energy 
consumption, or network load, since they are completely passive. Attacks against integrity and 
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availability are expected to increase CPU utilization and net-vvork load because the attacker >vill 
introduce additional packets into the network that will be processed. 
3.3 Approach 
To accomplish the aforementioned research goals, vulnerabilities in the Player protocol 
that compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability a.re identified. An exploit based on 
each vulnerability is written to compromise Player communication. A repeatable set of 
commands a client sends to a robot is defined for each experiment in Section :uo.:1. \Vhile the 
client transmits these baseline commands, the s:vstem is subjected to a. specific exploit while 
operating using a specific IPsec protocol. Exploits that compromise confidentiality are 
successful if they correctly determine the position of the robot. An exploit that successfully 
injects false position data. into the Player connection successfully compromises integrity. 
Exploits that compromise availability arc successful if they terminate the connection between 
the client and the robot. The performance of the system under these different conditions is 
measured to quantif~y the effects of defense protocols and exploits. 
3.4 System Boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT) in this research is the Pla;y-er Defense System (PDS). 
PDS (Figure 10) consists of Alice (Player client), Bob (Pla:vcr server), \Iallory (malicious 
attacker), a defense protocol, and the network over which communication occurs. Input to the 
system is legitimate position commands and position data-requests from the dient (Alice) as 
well a.s malicious exploits from the attacker (1lallory). Output from the system is both the 
physical movement of the server (Bob) and position data packets sent in response. 
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defense protocol. :VIallory does not attempt any brute force attacks to determine 
authentication or encryption kcyf-1. 
Network- The network is a communication channel that supports the coordination 
of multiple end systems. It provides no confidentiality, integrity, or authentication 
to the messages sent by end systems. It is a shared medium, meaning systems 
contend for use of the channel and any messages can be read by all systems. 
Defense Protocol- The defense protocol is the Component Under Test (GCT). It is 
a t1ecurity mechanism agreed to b:v both Alice and Bob in which the:v usc a shared 
secret to protect one or more principles of the CIA t1ecurity model. 
\Vhile Player has been developed to support multiple client and server agents, this 
research limits the scope to a single client and server to focus on analyzing the vulnerabilities in 
the Player protocol. Player also supports many different robot services other than 2-
dimensional position, but those arc also beyond the t1cope of this research. Exploits employed 
by \Iallory arc limited to the following network protocols: Player, TCP, lP, ARP, and Ethernet. 
That is, l\lallory does not attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the Player application itself to 
execute arbitrar:y instructions on the end systems of either Alice or Bob with an exploit such as 
a buffer-overflow attack. Rather, ::VIallory exploits weaknesses in Player's netvvork protocol to 
externally cause effects. This distinction is made to focus the scope of this research on Player's 
network protocol '.rulnerabilitics rather than its software application vulnerabilities. 
3.5 Syste~ Services 
PDS provides two services: a connnand and control service and defense against exploits. 
The cornrnand and control service receives an input stream of position corrnnands and position 
data-requests that are transmitted from Alice to Bob. A position command is successful if Bob 
moves as commanded and fails if he either docs not move or moves in a way other than 
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commanded. A position data-request is successful if Bob replies '<vith a correct position data. 
packet and failt> if he either doct> not reply or replies with incorrect data. Failure modes as 
described above for the command and control service arc not considered part of this research as 
they do not support the goals defined in Section 8.2. 
The second service PDS provides is defense against exploits. Specifically, PDS protects 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The outcome is a success if the system defeats the 
exploit. The outcome is a failure, however, if the exploit is not defeated. The precise goals of 
each exploit are enumerated in Section :1.10.:1. 
3. 6 Workload 
The workload submitted to PDS it> composed of two distinct partt>: a t>tream of 
commands sent from Alice to Bob to exercise the legitimate connnand and control of Bob and 
one of six exploits, launched by 1viallory, to demonstrate the defensive service of PDS. Since the 
goal of this research is to study real-time command and controL the legitimate command stream 
models a human pilot remotely piloting the robot. This workload it> comprit>ed of a continumm, 
periodic t>trcam of commands. ln addition, t>ince a human pilot requires real-time feedback to 
correctly pilot the robot , the legitimate connnand stream will also contain a certain ratio of 
data-requests per commands. These >vorkload parameters are defined in Section :3.8.2. 
Exploits are submitted to the system as part of the "vorkload. The six selected exploits 
arc designed to emulate common network attackt> that compromise one of the principles of the 
CIA security model. Each of the selected exploits demonstrates real-world impact on the 
command and control of a mobile robot and is publically available. These exploits arc 
enumerated in Section 3.8.2. 
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Exploit- Jviallory launches one of six specific attacks that each target a single 
principle of the CIA security model. Each exploit is inscparabl~y related to its 
exploitation outcome metric and can also affect Bob's CPU utilization, power 
consmnption, and network load. These exploits are enumerated in Section 8.9. 
3.9 Factors 
Table ;) summarizes the factors and levels used in this research. 
Table :3. Factors and Levels 
Factor Levels 
Defense Protocol Konc, lPscc AH, lPscc ESP, lPscc AH+ESP 
Exploit Kane, Passive Sniffing, 
ARP Cache Poisoning, TCP Connection Hijacking, 
TCP Reset, TCP Connection Flooding 
Defense Protocol- The defense protocol is chosen as a factor bccaur:;c it is the 
component under ter:;t. lt is expected to affect ail performance metricr:;. lPr:;cc is used 
for the defense protocol levels because it provides confidentiality and integrity 
protection for any application layer protocol vvithout the need to modify that 
application. Transport mode is selected for this research because the single client-
server pair, defined in Section 3.4, resides on the same subnet with no intermediary 
routers. The IPsec configuration file that defines the security associations used b:y 
Alice and Bob is included in Appendix B. PGP, SSL, and SSH are exduded from 
this research because they require modification to the Player application. Tcpcrypt 
is also excluded because it is still a work in progress and authentication requires 
modification to the Player application. The factor levels are 
:.Jane- Ko dcfeni-ic protocol is used. 
IPsec Authentication Header (AH) IPsec with integrity r:md authentication 
protection in transport mode. 
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HP Procurve 10/100Mbps 
Hub 12 – J3294A
Power Monitor
<No Network Connection>
Dell Latitude E6510
Windows 7 SP1 64-bit
NI LabVIEW 9.0.1 32-bit
DAQ Board
NI USB-6008
Analog Voltage/Current 
Monitor
Power Supply
CUI INC EPS050100 
Regulated 5VDC 1A
Ethernet
Ethernet Ethernet
Ethernet
5VDC
5VDC
USB
 
 
 
 
sar –u 1 80 
> cpuUtil.txt
 
 
Statistics > Summary 
Simultaneous
Simultaneous
[Alice, Bob, Mallory] Powered On
[Alice, Bob, Mallory] Booted
[Alice, Bob] IPsec Security Associations Loaded
[Bob] Player Server Launched
[Alice]      Player Client Launched
[Alice, Bob] Player Client Connects to Server
Setup
Time
[Alice, Bob] Player Client/Sever Begin Sending
    Command/Data Loop
Steady State
Attack
Data Collection Events
[Bob]     Begins sysstat Log
[Pow Mon] Begins LabVIEW VI Log 
[Net Mon] Begins Wireshark Capture
Experimental Events
[Pow Mon] LabVIEW VI Launched
[Net Mon] Wireshark Launched
Phase
80 seconds
Conclusion
[Bob]     Ends sysstat
[Pow Mon] Ends LabVIEW Virtual Instrument
[Net Mon] Ends Wireshark Capture
[Alice, Bob] Security Compromised 
    (if exploit success)
[Mallory] Executes Exploit
from pilot study data requires 70-75s to successfully overwhelm 13ob in this experimental 
configuration. 
After 80 1-leconds has pasi-ied, the Conclusion phase is entered and all data collection is 
halted. Sysstat., LabVIE\V, and \Vireshark are configured to halt automatically after the 
allotted time. Exploit. success is determined in three ways based upon which CIA security 
model principle is targeted. \Vhen targeting confidentiality, the exploit. is successfi1l if ::viallory's 
console prints out the correct position data (px=Om, py=Orn, pa=Orn). \Vhen targeting 
integrity, the exploit is successful if Alice's console prints out incorrect position data (anything 
other than px=Om, py=Om, pa=Om). \Vhen targeting availability, the exploit is succei-ii-iful if 
the connection between Alice and Bob is terminated during the Attack phai-ie. 
3.10.4 Validation Strategy. Stage v4.0.1, a Player simulator described in Section 2.4.2, is 
used to validate Player responses and robot behavior of the PDS under the baseline workload. 
Performance results are compared >vith other related works to validate system response [CD~OO, 
EiviS02, AVT041. \Vhile the results are not expected to match exactly, there should be a 
correlation between the results obi-ierved in the SUT and thme published in the academic 
literature. Section 4.:3.:~ validates this research by comparing experimental results with these 
related \Vorks. 
3.11 Experimental Design 
To measure the rclationshipi-i between ail of the factors listed in Section 3.9, a full 
factorial design is selected. A total of two factors are chosen \vith 4 and {) levels each. A full 
factorial design requires 4 x 6 = 24 unique experiments. The statistical confidence level is gsrx~ .. 
lt is expected that no more than G repetitions will be required for a total of G x 24 = 120 
experirnen ts. 
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3.12 Methodology Summary 
This chapter defined the methodology to 1) Demonstrate the vulnerability of the Player 
protocol to network attack, 2) Demonstrate the effectiveness of IPsec to secure the Player 
protocoL and ;)) Quantify the cost of IPsec to secure the Player protocol. The Player Defense 
Syt1tem (PDS) provides both legitimate command and control services for a Player robot as well 
as defense against exploits that compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
system. The components, performance mctricf-1, system and workload parameters, a.nd factors 
for this research arc abo defined. The evaluation technique and experimental design arc 
described to allow the experiments herein to be reproduced. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
4 .1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected from the experiments defined in 
Chapter 3. Analyt>is of the data satisfies research goals 1 and 2, defined in Section :3.2, b:y 
demonstrating the vulnerabilities of Player and the effectiveness of lPt>ec. A cost function it> 
defined to satit>fy ret>earch goal 3 by quantifying the cost of lPt>ec to secure the Player protocol. 
The power consumption metric, detailed in Section 3. 7, is excluded from analysis in thit> 
chapter for several reasons. Because a wired network is selected, the CPU of the embedded 
system is the onl:y predominant power consuming device. Since the power consumption of the 
CPU is directly related to its utilization, pmver consumption is a redundant metric for this 
experimental configuration lTexllj. The power consumption data it> none-the-less included in 
Appendix F to aid future research in this area but is not discut>t>ed in this chapter. Chapter 5 
provides suggestions for fi1ture work related to power analysis. 
Section 4.2 describes a cost function to analyze the performance tradeoHs associated with 
employing IPsec with respect to CPU utilization, netvvork load, and defensive capability. 
Section 4.:1 inputs the data collected in this research into the cost function to determine the cost 
of employing each dcfent>e protocol under a t>pecific scenario. Section 4.4 computet> the cost 
function with respect to t\vo additional scenarios to demonstrate the effect of scenario 
parameters on cost output. Section 4.5 applies the results from this research to the broader 
scope of securing Internet client-server communication. Section 4.6 provides a. summary of the 
analysis and results. 
4.2 Cost Function 
The cost function defined in this section synthesizes three distinct. scalar costs (exploit 
success, CPC utilization, and network load) measured in this research into a single scalar output 
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that every exploit succeeds >vhen no defense protocol is used. This is because neither the TCP 
header nor Player payload arc authenticated or encrypted. TCP connection hijacking has a 
succesf-1 rate of only 80% because of the large amount of traffic (ACK storm) it generates during 
the attack. It. is hypothesized that Alice occasionally does not correctly receive f(>rged Player 
data either because l'viallory's exploit is overwhelmed and becomes unresponsive, or the excessive 
ACK storm packets collide \vith the forged packets on the Ethernet hub. 
The exploitation ::mccess data (Table 8) also satisfies research goal 2 by demonstrating 
that IPsec is able to protect the Player protocol. Passive sniffing is successful against IPsec AH 
because lVIallory is able to dit1t1ect the unencrypted Pla:vcr pa:doad. lPt1ec AH defeats all other 
exploitf-1 because it authenticates the TCP header and Player payload. lPsec ESP defeats all of 
the tested exploits because Scapy is unable to dissect. the encrypted TCP header and Player 
payload. Hovvever, it should be noted that it is conceivable that attacks against IPsec ESP in 
encrypt-only mode, similar to those Paterson and Y au demonstrate, could be used against 
Player [PaY06j. For example, toggling the TCP reset flag of encrypted Player packetf-1 could 
lead to a t1m:cessful TCP reset attack. So while lPsec ESP defeats integrity exploits described in 
Section :~.9, it does not ensure integrity protection in encr:ypt-only mode. IPsec AH-ESP 
defeats all exploits described in Section :3.9 because it both authenticates and encrypts the 
transport and application layers. The attacks implemented in this research are infeasible 
against lPscc AH-ESP. 
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ne
nmax
nmax
sho-vvs the average measured packet si~e for the data collected in this research. These values are 
calculated by dividing the total network load in b:ytes by the number of packets transmitted 
(Appendix F). lPsec AH increases the measured packet size by the expected 24 b:ytes. 
Elkeelany et al. also conclude that IPsec ESP increases the packet size by 22 bytes due to 10 
bytes of fixed header and 12 bytes of ICV. The authors note that ESP may use additional 
padding (up to 25i5 bytes), depending on the selected encryption algorithm. Table 11 shows the 
average measured packet she (in bytes) for this research increased by :w bytes as a result of 
ESP. ~ote that ESP is not configured to use optional authentication (i.e., no ICV is appended) 
in these experiments, so the expected overhead of ESP is 10 b:vtes of fixed header plus 
encryption padding. In this research the encryption algorithm, AES-2i56, is responsible f()r 26 
b:ytes of additional padding on average. The IPsec AH+ESP network load reported in Section 
4.:3.2 is validated because its overhead is the expected sum of both AH and ESP: 24 bytes I :36 
bytes GO bytes. 
Table 11. Average :'dcasurcd Packet Size (b:vtes) 
Factor Level None IPsec AH IPsec ESP IPsec AH +ESP 
None 94 118 uo li'i4 
Overhead 0 24 :36 60 
Results from Argyroudis ct. al. validate the CPU mctrics gathered in this research 
[AVT04j. The authors find that the network security protocols, SSL and lPscc, do not 
significantly impact real-time comnmnication on mobile devices. An older HP iP AQ H:36:30 ;vith 
a 206\JH~ StrongAR:VI processor and :121vm RA::VI is tested in their research. Their system has 
significantly less resources than the embedded system (Bob) specified in Section ;) .8. As a 
result, it is expected that the SUT's CPU resources in this research are affected even less by 
lPsec. The measured CPC utilization (Table 9) confirms that the CPU overhead is relatively 
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lower em;t beeam;e IPsee ESP consumes fewer CPU and network resources than IPsec AH ESP, 
while st.i II defeat.i ng all or t.ho exploils. ll is impona.nl t.o not.c lhat. t>a.llcr·son a.nd Yau 
domonslrat.o at.t.ac:ks on lt>soc ESt> when nol used in conjundion wilh aut.hcnlicat.ion [l>a.YOG1. 
Thm;, for the Likely Exploit Scenario, IPse<: AH ESP would be the preferred defense protocol 
given its small additional cost over IPsec ESP and the security benefits authentication provides. 
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Figure 14. 9.1'){ Confidence Interval: Likely Exploit Scenmio 
4·4 Scenario Exploration 
Section L~.~ applies the data gathered from this research to the cost function developed in 
Section 4.2 using a particular set of scenario parameters defined as the Likely Exploit Scenmio. 
This section demonstrates the importance of selecting appropriate scenmio pammeters by 
computing the cost function using the same measured data hnt: with different 1-;cena.rio 
parameters. The cost results for each additional scenmio me compared with the Likely Exploit 
Scenario. 
1.1.1 Confld~mti;~lity Free Scem1rio. The Confidentiality Free Scenario i1-; a small 
deviation from the Likely Exploit Scenario in which the cost of losing confidentiality ( ) is set 
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4.5 Application of Results 
This section frames the results of this research within the wider context of network 
security. Results support the ease for authentication and encryption by default due to modern 
harchvare advances. Additionally~ this research highlights the trend that as a Player system is 
scaled to include additional hosts, it is expected that the network overhead introduced b:y lPsec 
>vill become more consequential than the CPC overhead. Finally~ results from this research 
highlights potential weaknesses in the abilit:v of application layer security protocols (e.g., SSL) 
to protect against DoS attacks that target the TCP connection and supports the adoption of 
transport layer protocols (e.g., tcperypt) to mitigate these weaknesses. 
4. 5.1 The Case f()r Authentication a11d Encr:yption b_y Defa11lt. This research supports 
the findings of Caldera et al. and Argyroudis et al. that IPsec can be used to protect nehvork 
traffic of embedded devices with an acceptable cost to CPU utilization lCD:.JOO, AVT04j. Kote 
that Section 3.8.1 specifics that SHA-256 and AES-256 were used as the cryptographic 
algorithms. Both algorithms are highly regarded as secure by the cryptographic cormnunity. 
The selected key sizes make brute force attacks against them infeasible toda:y and represent the 
highest computational cost an embedded device is likely to encounter. Analysis of the measured 
CPU utilization (Table 9) finds that when no exploit is used, the CPC cost to run lPscc 
AH-ESP is only 0.52% utilization higher than without a. defense protocol. As embedded 
devices continue to become more powerful, the relative CPU overhead of authentication and 
encryption algorithms >vill naturally continue to diminish. 
This research also demonstrates the lmv resources needed to exploit an unprotected 
protocol running over TCP/IP. Section ;) .8.1 details the hardware specifications for \Iallory: a 
laptop released in 2007 running an open-source tool, Scapy. The TCP /IP attacks implemented 
against Player for this research arc publically available and any application layer protocol that 
G4 
does not employ some form of strong authentication and encryption is therefore assumed to be 
equally vulnerable. Because advancements in hardware allow more devices to be capable of 
authentication and encryption ~Uld the difficulty in attacking TCP/lP communication is 
decreasing, authentication and encryption should become the default. rather than the exception 
for network protocol design. 
4.5.2 Scaling: CrU vs . . Nehvork Overhead. Performance analysis data collected for a 
single client-server pair running Player can be used to estimate the effects of scaling on system 
performance. Consider that the number of independent client-server pairs is increased and that 
each pair that is added to the s:vstcm consists of another two devices with the same parameters 
as the client (Alice) and server (Bob), detailed in Section 3.8. Independent client-server pairs 
transmit. over a shared medium but only comnmnicate behveen pairs. Assume that each pair 
independently generates the same vvorkload of Player messages tested in this research. Also, 
assume that lVlallory does not launch exploits. .\l"ote that precise analysis of this problem -vvould 
require network simulation or experimentation, but an estimation of trends is still possible with 
the data gathered in this research. 
Each client-server pair added to the system introduces additional CPU resources that 
can be used to perform the authentication and encryption algorithms necessary for IPsec to 
protect communication. Since each client-server pair is independent in its communication, it is 
estimated that the CPC overhead with respect to lPsec will not increase. ln contrast, each 
client-server pair added to the system docs not introduce additional network resources. Since 
each additional client-server pair consumes additional network resources, the network overhead 
of lPscc becomes significant. 
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Figure 17. Client-Server Pairs vs. Average Packet Size 
As the average packet size for an applicMion increases, the aven1ge overhe~1d introduced 
by IPscc AH ESP (GO bytes) becomes iusiguificaut. For example, an application with au 
average packet size of L)OO bytes (the maximum transmi~~ion unit of Ethernet) would incur an 
estimated average packet size increase of only 4c){ running T.Psec i\H I ESP. As a result, it is 
expected that the system would ouly lose au estimated 4c){ of the maximum supported pairs. 
ln summary, re~nlt~ predict that when scaled indepenrlently, network overhearl, not CPU 
overhead: i~ the limiting factor. ln addition, the ~maller the average packet 1-iille of an 
application is, the higher the relative network overhead of IPscc. 
·1.<1.3 lnterm~t Client-Server Applications. The Player protocol 1-itnrlierl in this refoiearch is 
only one of many application layer protocols that rnn over TCP / lP. However, the 
vulnerabilities that nrc demonstrated can be applied to a wider set of protocols. Any TCP /IP 
protocol that doe~ not employ some form of 1-itrong authentication and encryption is potentially 
vulnerable to the exploits implemented in thi~ research. This re~earch reveals that emberlrlerl 
devices nrc at least as vulnerable as desktop systems with respect to the network st~1ck when 
they communicate using the same insecure protocols. In some -vvays, embedded devices are more 
vulnerable as demonstrated by the TCP connection flooding DoS attack. Embedded devices, 
such as Player robots, acting as servers t:ypically possess fewer computing ~Uld memory resources 
and thus can be overwhelmed more easily. 
SSL is the de facto protocol to provide process-to-process security over the Internet f(n· 
client-server applications. Two of the exploits demonstrated in this research, TCP connection 
hijacking and TCP reset , compromise weaknesses in the TCP protocol. These weaknesses arise 
because the TCP header is not authenticated, allowing 1viallory to modify information related to 
the TCP connection without Alice or Bob's knowledge. Because SSL is an application layer 
protocoL it is not able to authenticate the TCP header, making it vulnerable to DoS attacks 
that target the TCP connection. \Vatson demonstrates that TCP reset can be used to attack a 
TCP / IP protocol that does not authenticate the TCP header rvVat041. Another disadvantage of 
SSL is that applications must be modified to support SSL, adding complexity and development 
cost to these Internet applications. 
lPsec is able to authenticate the TCP header, defeating the TCP DoS attacks described 
in the preceding paragraph, but it provides only machine-to-machine, rather than process-to-
process, security. The disadvantage is that IPsec cannot authenticate users, only machines. For 
example, IPsec cannot distinguish bet>veen multiple Player clients on the same machine. In 
addition. lPsec docs not interoperate uvcr Network Address Translation (:'-l'AT) which is a 
popular technique used to extend 1Pv4 addresses. NAT could be needed in a mobile 
environment when Player is actually deployed with 1Pv4. 
Tcpcrypt, described in Section 2.:3.:3, mitigates many of the disadvantages that SSL and 
IPsec possess. It. provides authentication to the TCP header, protection to any application layer 
protocol, and process-to-process security. By authenticating the sequence number, shown in 
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Figure 18) tcpcrypt defeats TCP connection hijacking) and by authenticating the flags, tcpcrypt 
defeats TCP reset. Because tcpcrypt operates in the transport layer, it requires less 
modification to applications than SSL. Tcpcrypt also intcroperatcs with KAT, allowing Player 
to utilize this technology if needed. Theref(>re because of these advantages, tcpcrypt deserves 
attention from the security community &s a mechanism to provide more protection to TCP/ IP 
applications than is currently available. 
src port I dst port I 
Seq no . I -(64-bit seq)-: 
1--------a-c_k_n_o_. _____ _._ =(~~-~i! ~c}I =: 
d.off.lflagsl window I checksum I urg . ptr. I 
options (e.g., SACK) I MAC option I 
data (encrypted) 1 = J~ Ie~it5 = =: 
Figure 18. Data Packet Using Tcpcrypt rnHHl01. 
4. 6 Analysis and Results Summary 
This chapter analy~es the results of the experiments defined in Chapter :1 to accomplish 
the research goals of this thesis. A cost function is defined to quantify the performance and 
security cost associated with running a defense protocol for protection against exploitation. 
lVIcasurcd data is input to the cost function to determine the defense protocol with least cost. 
"C ruler the Likel:y Exploit Scenario, IPsec AH-ESP is found to be the preferred defense protocol 
because of its relatively lovv CPU and network performance costs and its ability to defeat all the 
exploits implemented in this research. Tvvo additional scenarios are explored to demonstrate the 
flexibility of the cost function for different usc-cases. Results support the case for 
authentication and encryption of TCP/ IP cornnmnication by default and highlight potential 
challenges of using lPsec for systems that must scale to many hosts sending small packets. This 
research identifies tcpcrypt &s a security protocol of interest f(>r client-server applications that 
communicate over TCP/ IP because of its unique ability to avoid some of the disadvantages 
associated -vvith IPsec and SSL. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Thesis Summary 
The following three research goals are presented in Chapter :3 and accomplished in the 
analysis provided in Chapter 4. 
1) Demonstrate the vulncrabili ty of the Player protocol to network attacks. 
This thesis demonstrates that the Player protocol is vulnerable to attacks on all three 
principles of the ClA security model. Results show that an attacker can e<.rvesdrop on position 
data. sent from the robot (Pla:ver server) to the command station (Pla:ver client). ln addition, 
Player is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks that allow an attacker to violate the integrity 
of the position data sent from the robot to the command station. Finall:y, this research 
demonstrates that Player is vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks that compromise the 
availability of the command station to command and control the robot. 
2) Demonstrate the cffectilreness of lPsec to secure the Player protocol. 
Experimental results demonstrate that lPsec AH is capable of securing Player against 
the attacks against integrity, and availability implemented in this thesis. IPsec ESP ·with no 
optional authentication defeated attacks against confidentiality, integrity. and availability but is 
not recommended clue to published vulnerabilities of its ovvn [13el96, Pa Y06]. Results shmv that 
lPsec AH+ESP provides the highest level of security because it defeats all of the exploits 
implemented in this research and has no published weaknesses. 
:3) Quantif}r the cost of lPsec to secure the Player protocol. 
l\Ietrics gathered from this research show that mobile devices arc well equipped to secure 
Player-like connnand and control cmmnunication with IPsec. IPsec AH-ESP increased the 
CPU utilization by just O.i52% and the network load by 22. 9Kbps ( 64. ;)% increa..se) . Results 
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from the cost function, defined in Section 4.2, show that for the Likely Exploit Scenario) IPsec 
AH-ESP is the preferred defense protocol because of its abilit:y to defeat exploits and relatively 
low overhead. For the Confidentiality Free Scenario, lPsec AH is found to be the optimal 
defense protocol because it defeats integrity and availability exploits implemented in this 
research. Finally, in the Unlikely Exploit Scenario, using no defense protocol results in the 
lmvest cost because the probability of attack in this scenario is miniscule. The low probability 
of attack causes the overhead of IPsec in the cost function to become significant. 
vVhen results are applied to the wider field of net>vork security, three areas are 
highlighted. First. this research demonstrates the low capabilities needed for an attacker to 
compromise an unprotected protocol running over TCP /lP and that modern mobile devices arc 
easily capable of authenticating and encr}1)ting nehvork connnunication. As a result, this 
research supports that authentication and encr,yption become the default rather than the 
exception for network communication of mobile devices. Second, this research finds that the 
network uvcrhead, not CPU uvcrhead, of lPscc is expected to be a limiting factor when the 
system is scaled. Because Pla:vcr communicates with a low average packet size the network 
overhead of IPsec is relatively large (6:).8% increase compared to no defense protocol). Finall:y, 
the TCP denial-of-service attacks implemented in this research are expected to be effective 
against SSL because it cannot authenticate the TCP header. Tcpcrypt is identified as a 
protocol of interest that defeats such attacks while ctvoiding some of the disadvantages 
a..-;sociated ·with SSL and IPsec. 
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
This section describes future research to extend this thesis. 
Performance analysis using a wireless network would be beneficial as this is likely 
ho-vv a. Player system would be actually deployed. A wireless environment would 
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make such a fundamental change feasible. This shift would significantly reduce the ability for 
malicious uscrf-1 to perform network attacks. 
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H 
# include "config.h" 
#endif 
 
#include <epan/packet.h> 
 
/*********** Player Defines **************************/ 
/***** Message Type Defines ******/ 
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_DATA 1 
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_CMD 2 
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ 3 
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_ACK 4 
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_SYNCH 5 
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_NACK 6 
 
/***** Device Interface Defines ******/ 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE 1 
#define PLAYER_POWER_CODE 2 
#define PLAYER_GRIPPER_CODE 3 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CODE 4 
 
/*** Player Device Interface Subtypes ***/ 
/* Defined in libplayerinterface\player_interfaces.h */ 
/** Player:Request Subtypes **/ 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEVLIST 1  
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DRIVERINFO 2 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEV 3 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATA 4 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATAMODE 5  
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_AUTH 7 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_NAMESERVICE 8 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_ADD_REPLACE_RULE 10 
 
/** Player:Synch Subtypes **/ 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_SYNCH_OK 1 
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_SYNCH_OVERFLOW 2 
 
/** Payload Player:Request:Datamode **/ 
#define PLAYER_DATAMODE_PUSH  1 
#define PLAYER_DATAMODE_PULL  2 
 
 
/*** Position2d Device Interface Subtypes ***/ 
/*** Position2d:Request Subtypes ***/ 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_GET_GEOM 1 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_MOTOR_POWER 2 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_VELOCITY_MODE 3 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_POSITION_MODE 4 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SET_ODOM 5 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_RESET_ODOM 6 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SPEED_PID 7 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_POSITION_PID 8 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SPEED_PROF 9 
 
/** Position2d:Data Subtypes ***/ 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_DATA_STATE 1 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_DATA_GEOM 2 
 
/** Position2d:Command Subtypes */ 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_VEL 1 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_POS 2 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_CAR 3 
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_VEL_HEAD 4 
 
/*********** Player Defines **************************/ 
 
 
#define PLAYER_PORT 6665 
 
static int proto_player = -1; 
 
/* hf_* variables are used to hold the Wireshark IDs of 
* our header fields; they are filled out when we call 
* proto_register_field_array() in proto_register_player() 
*/ 
static int hf_player_header = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_host = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_robot = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_interface = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_index = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_type = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_subtype = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_subtype_player_req = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_subtype_player_synch = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_req = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_data = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_cmd = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_timestamp = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_sequencenumber = -1; 
static int hf_player_header_payloadsize = -1; 
 
static int hf_player_payload = -1; 
 
/* Payload Player:Request:Datamode */ 
static int hf_player_payload_player_datamode = -1; 
 
/* Payload Player:ResponseAck:Device */ 
static int hf_player_payload_player_respack_device_name = -1; 
 
/* payload_position2d_data  (also includes payload_position2d_cmd_vel */ 
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_data_px = -1; 
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_data_py = -1; 
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_data_pa = -1; 
 
/* payload_position2d_cmd_vel */ 
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vx = -1; 
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vy = -1; 
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_va = -1; 
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_motorstate = -1; 
 
/* IDs of the subtrees that may be created */ 
static int ett_player = -1; 
static int ett_player_header = -1; 
static int ett_player_payload = -1; 
 
/* Enumeration Labels */ 
static const value_string header_interface_names[] = 
{  
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE, "Player"}, 
 {PLAYER_POWER_CODE, "Power"}, 
 {PLAYER_GRIPPER_CODE, "Gripper"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_CODE, "Position2D"}, 
 {0, NULL} 
}; 
 
static const value_string header_messagetype_names[]= 
{ 
 {PLAYER_MSGTYPE_DATA, "Data"}, 
 {PLAYER_MSGTYPE_CMD, "Command"}, 
 {PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ, "Request"}, 
 {PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_ACK, "Response-Ack"}, 
 {PLAYER_MSGTYPE_SYNCH, "Synch"}, 
 {PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_NACK, "Response-NegAck"}, 
 {0, NULL} 
}; 
 
/******** PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE Device Interface Subtypes **********/ 
/**** Player:Request, Subtypes ****/ 
static const value_string header_subtype_player_req_names[]= 
{ 
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEVLIST, "Device List"}, 
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DRIVERINFO, "Driver Info"},  
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEV, "Device"},  
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATA, "Data"},  
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATAMODE, "Datamode"}, 
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_AUTH, "Auth"}, 
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_NAMESERVICE, "Nameservice"}, 
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_ADD_REPLACE_RULE, "Add/Replace Rule"}, 
 {0, NULL} 
}; 
/**** Player:Synch, Subtypes ****/ 
static const value_string header_subtype_player_synch_names[]= 
{ 
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_SYNCH_OK, "OK"}, 
 {PLAYER_PLAYER_SYNCH_OVERFLOW, "Overflow"}, 
 {0, NULL} 
}; 
 
/******** PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE Device Interface Subtypes **********/ 
/**** Position2D:Request, Subtypes ****/ 
static const value_string header_subtype_position2d_req_names[]= 
{ 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_GET_GEOM, "Get Geometry"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_MOTOR_POWER, "Motor Power"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_VELOCITY_MODE, "Velocity Mode"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_POSITION_MODE, "Position Mode"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SET_ODOM, "Set Odom"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_RESET_ODOM, "Reset Odom"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SPEED_PID, "Speed PID"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_POSITION_PID, "Position PID"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SPEED_PROF, "Speed Profile"}, 
 {0, NULL} 
}; 
/**** Position2D:Data, Subtypes ****/ 
static const value_string header_subtype_position2d_data_names[]= 
{ 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_DATA_STATE, "State"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_DATA_GEOM, "Geometry"}, 
 {0, NULL} 
}; 
/**** Position2D:Command, Subtypes ****/ 
static const value_string header_subtype_position2d_cmd_names[]= 
{ 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_VEL, "Velocity"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_POS, "Position"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_CAR, "Car-like"}, 
 {PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_VEL_HEAD, "Heading"}, 
 {0, NULL} 
}; 
 
/*************** PAYLOAD Enumeration Labels *****************************/ 
/* Player:Request:Datamode */ 
static const value_string payload_player_datamode_names[]= 
{ 
 {PLAYER_DATAMODE_PUSH, "Push"}, 
 {PLAYER_DATAMODE_PULL, "Pull"}, 
 {0, NULL} 
}; 
 
/* Dissector function for the Player Protocol */ 
/* The Dissector is called in two different cases, one to get a  
   summary of the packet (tree==NULL), and one to get details of the packet */ 
/* tvb: buffer to hold packet data 
   pinfo: contains general info about the protocol 
   tree: detailed dissection */ 
static void dissect_player(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree) 
{ 
 /* Offset tracks the location of the current item added to the tree */ 
 gint offset = 0; 
 
 guint device_interface = 0; 
 guint message_type = 0; 
 guint message_subtype = 0; 
 guint payload_size = 0; 
 
 /* Set column text to protocol name */ 
    col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PLAYER"); 
     
 /* Clear out stuff in the info column */ 
    col_clear(pinfo->cinfo,COL_INFO); 
 
 /* Update the info column with header information */ 
 device_interface = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 8); /* Defined in tvbuff.h */ 
 message_type = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 16); 
 message_subtype = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 20);  
 payload_size = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 36); 
 col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Inter: %s, Type: %s, Payload Len: %d",  
  val_to_str(device_interface, header_interface_names, "Unknown (0x%02x)"), 
  val_to_str(message_type, header_messagetype_names, "Unknown (0x%02x)"), 
  payload_size 
  ); 
 
 /* When tree != NULL, this is main asking for details of the packet */ 
 if(tree != NULL) 
 { 
  proto_item *player_item = NULL; 
  proto_item *player_header_item = NULL; 
  proto_item *player_payload_item = NULL; 
 
  proto_tree *player_tree = NULL; 
  proto_tree *player_header_tree = NULL; 
  proto_tree *player_payload_tree = NULL; 
 
  /* Add a new tree node, label with Player protocol, tvb=data, consume */ 
  /* from beginning (0) to end (-1). */ 
  player_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_player, tvb, 0, -1, FALSE); 
  /* Add a Player subtree to the new Tree Node */ 
  player_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(player_item, ett_player); 
   
  /* Add a Header subtree to the Player Tree */ 
  /* Headers are 40bytes long */ 
  player_header_item = proto_tree_add_item(player_tree, hf_player_header, tvb, offset, 40, FALSE); 
  player_header_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(player_header_item, ett_player_header); 
   
  /* Add Header items */ 
  proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_host, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
  offset+=4; 
  proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_robot, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
  offset+=4; 
  proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_interface, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
  offset+=4; 
  proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
  offset+=4; 
  proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_type, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
  offset+=4; 
 
  /* The Header Message Subtype is defined based on the Device Interface and Message Type*/  
  /* of that packet */ 
  switch(device_interface) 
  { 
   case PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE: 
    switch(message_type) 
    { 
     case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ: 
      proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_player_req, tvb, offset, 
4, FALSE); 
      break; 
     case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_SYNCH: 
      proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_player_synch, tvb, 
offset, 4, FALSE); 
      break; 
     case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_ACK: /* Uses same subtypes as Request Message Type */ 
      proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_player_req, tvb, offset, 
4, FALSE); 
      break; 
     default: /* Use generic subtype */ 
      proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
      break; 
    } 
    break; 
 
   case PLAYER_POWER_CODE: 
    break; 
 
   case PLAYER_GRIPPER_CODE: 
    break; 
 
   case PLAYER_POSITION2D_CODE: 
    switch(message_type) 
    { 
     case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ: 
      proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_req, tvb, 
offset, 4, FALSE); 
      break; 
     case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_DATA:  
      proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_data, tvb, 
offset, 4, FALSE); 
      break; 
     case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_CMD: 
      proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_cmd, tvb, 
offset, 4, FALSE); 
      break; 
     default: /* Use generic subtype */ 
      proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
      break; 
    } 
    break; 
   default: /* If device interface is other than one defined above, display generic version */ 
    proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
    break; 
  } 
  offset+=4; 
  proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
  offset+=8; /* Double = 8 bytes */ 
  proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_sequencenumber, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
  offset+=4; 
  proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_payloadsize, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
  offset+=4; 
 
  /* Add text summary for dissection window */ 
  proto_item_append_text(player_item, ", Inter: %s, Type: %s, Payload Len: %d", 
            val_to_str(device_interface, header_interface_names, "Unknown (0x%02x)"), 
   val_to_str(message_type, header_messagetype_names, "Unknown (0x%02x)"), 
   payload_size 
   ); 
 
  /* If a Payload is present, add a Payload subtree to the Player Tree */ 
  /* The Payload comprises whatever data (if any) is present after the 40 byte header */ 
  if(tvb_length(tvb) > 40) /* Defined in tvbuff.h */ 
  { 
   player_payload_item = proto_tree_add_item(player_tree, hf_player_payload, tvb, 40, -1, FALSE); 
   player_payload_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(player_payload_item, ett_player_payload); 
 
    
   switch(device_interface) 
   { 
    case PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE: 
     switch(message_type) 
     { 
      case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ: 
       switch(message_subtype) 
       { 
        case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEVLIST: 
         break; 
 
        case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DRIVERINFO: 
         break; 
 
        case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEV: /* Uses similar data format to header */ 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_host, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_robot, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_interface, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
         break; 
 
        case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATA: 
         break; 
 
        case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATAMODE: 
         proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_payload_player_datamode, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
         offset+=4; 
         break; 
 
        case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_AUTH: 
         break; 
 
        case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_NAMESERVICE: 
         break; 
 
        case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_ADD_REPLACE_RULE: 
         break; 
       } 
       break; 
 
       case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_ACK: 
        switch(message_subtype) 
        { 
         case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEV:  /* Uses similar data format to header 
*/ 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_host, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_robot, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_interface, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
          offset+=4; 
          proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_payload_player_respack_device_name, tvb, offset, -1, FALSE); 
          /* offset+=4;  Rest of payload is a string containing the 
device name */           
          break; 
        } 
        break; 
     } 
     break; 
 
    case PLAYER_POWER_CODE: 
     break; 
 
    case PLAYER_GRIPPER_CODE: 
     break; 
 
    case PLAYER_POSITION2D_CODE: 
     switch(message_type) 
     { 
      case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_DATA:  
       /* Payload: player_position2d_data */      
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_data_px, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_data_py, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_data_pa, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vx, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vy, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_va, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_motorstate, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
       offset+=4; 
       break; 
      case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_CMD: 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vx, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vy, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_va, 
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE); 
       offset+=8; 
       proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, 
hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_motorstate, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE); 
       offset+=4; 
       break; 
 
     } 
     break; 
   }   
  } 
 } 
} 
 
 
/* Registers the protocol with Wireshark */ 
void proto_register_player(void) 
{ 
 /* A header field is something you can search/filter on. 
 *  
 * We create a structure to register our fields. It consists of an 
 * array of hf_register_info structures, each of which are of the format 
 * {&(field id), {name, abbrev, type, display, strings, bitmask, blurb, HFILL}}. 
 */ 
 static hf_register_info hf[] =  
 { 
  /* HEADER SECTION */ 
  /* FT_* defined in ftypes.h */ 
  { 
   &hf_player_header, 
   { 
    "Header", "player.header", 
    FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, "Player Header", HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload, 
   { 
    "Payload", "player.payload", 
    FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, "Player Payload", HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_host, 
   { 
    "Device Host", "player.devicehost", 
    FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_robot, 
   { 
    "Device Robot", "player.devicerobot", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_interface, 
   { 
    "Device Interface", "player.interface", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    header_interface_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_index, 
   { 
    "Device Index", "player.index", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_type, 
   { 
    "Type", "player.type", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    header_messagetype_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { /* Need to create multiple messagesubtype definitions. Each Device Interface */ 
    /* Defines its own message subtypes for each message type defines */ 
   &hf_player_header_subtype,  /* Generic message subtype def */ 
   { 
    "Subtype", "player.subtype", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_subtype_player_req, 
   { 
    "Subtype", "player.subtype.player.req", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    header_subtype_player_req_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_subtype_player_synch, 
   { 
    "Subtype", "player.subtype.player.synch", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    header_subtype_player_synch_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_req, 
   { 
    "Subtype", "player.subtype.position2d.req", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    header_subtype_position2d_req_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_data, 
   { 
    "Subtype", "player.subtype.position2d.data", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    header_subtype_position2d_data_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_cmd, 
   { 
    "Subtype", "player.subtype.position2d.cmd", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    header_subtype_position2d_cmd_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_timestamp, 
   { 
    "Timestamp", "player.timestamp", 
    FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_sequencenumber, 
   { 
    "Sequence Number", "player.sequencenumber", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_header_payloadsize, 
   { 
    "Payload Size", "player.payloadsize", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
 
 
  /*********************** PAYLOAD SECTION **********************************************/ 
 
  /****** Player:Request:Datamode ********/ 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_player_datamode, 
   { 
    "Data Mode", "player.payload.player.datamode", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_NONE, 
    payload_player_datamode_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  /****** Player:Response-Ack:Device ********/ 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_player_respack_device_name, 
   { 
    "Name", "player.payload.player.respack.device.name", 
    FT_STRINGZ, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
 
  /******************** DATA TYPE SECTION **********************/ 
  /* Position2d: player_position2d_data */ 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_position2d_data_px, 
   { 
    "PositionX (m)", "player.payload.position2d_data.px", 
    FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_position2d_data_py, 
   { 
    "PositionY (m)", "player.payload.position2d_data.py", 
    FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_position2d_data_pa, 
   { 
    "PositionA (rad)", "player.payload.position2d_data.pa", 
    FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
 
 
  /********************* CMD TYPE SECTION **********************/ 
   
  /* Position2d: player_position2d_cmd_vel */ 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vx, 
   { 
    "VelocityX (m/s)", "player.payload.position2d_cmd_vel.vx", 
    FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vy, 
   { 
    "VelocityY (m/s)", "player.payload.position2d_cmd_vel.vy", 
    FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_va, 
   { 
    "VelocityA (rad/s)", "player.payload.position2d_cmd_vel.va", 
    FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  }, 
  { 
   &hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_motorstate, 
   { 
    "Motor State", "player.payload.position2d_cmd_vel.motorstate", 
    FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, 
    NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL 
   } 
  } 
 
   
 
 }; 
 
 /* Setup protocol subtree array */ 
 static gint *ett[] = 
 { 
  &ett_player, 
  &ett_player_header, 
  &ett_player_payload 
 }; 
 
 /* Registers protocol. Format: (Name, Short Name, Abbrev) */ 
    proto_player = proto_register_protocol ("Player Protocol", "Player", "player"); 
 
 proto_register_field_array(proto_player, hf, array_length(hf)); 
 proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett)); 
} 
 
/* Creates a dissector handle for main program to call */ 
void proto_reg_handoff_player(void) 
{ 
    static dissector_handle_t player_handle; 
 
 /* Create a dissector handle associate with the player protocol and with 
 a routine to be called to dissect it*/ 
    player_handle = create_dissector_handle(dissect_player, proto_player); 
 
 /*Associate the player_handle with a TCP port number so that the main 
 program will know to call us when TCP traffic arrives on that port*/ 
    dissector_add_uint("tcp.port", PLAYER_PORT, player_handle); 
} 
 
#################################################################### 
## IPsec Configuration for Player Defense System  
## John Hagen 
## Masters in Cyber Operations AFIT/ENG AFRL/RYWC 
#################################################################### 
 
############ Flush the SAD and SPD ################################# 
flush; 
spdflush; 
 
########## Security Associations AH SHA256-256 bit key ############# 
add 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 ah 0x200 -A hmac-sha256 
 0x8d375a74b4a2c70d36dc9c6de2179c4493f30034ef3c3682afb6be2b60bf42e9; 
add 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.2 ah 0x300 -A hmac-sha256 
 0xb037b7c2a619fb0987bff4708eef2fb328c79aef1c26fddd46f2138a493c8708; 
 
########## Security Associations ESP AES-256 bit key ############### 
add 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 esp 0x201 -E aes-cbc 
 0x25ea0b76e21f20acab36da6642feb056fe98f14439b02db25091b13a5b85a75b; 
add 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.2 esp 0x301 -E aes-cbc 
 0x5e3bebefdaea58e98433e7b7824e6950756012e81aadd38509c5fb5cc7c3bda5; 
## To add authentication directly to ESP rather than use in conjunction with 
AH add: 
## -A hmac-sha256  
## <SHA256 key> 
 
########## Security Policies - AH Only ############################# 
## Require IPsec for all IP communication 
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P out ipsec 
## ah/transport//require; 
## 
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P in ipsec 
## ah/transport//require; 
 
########## Security Policies - ESP Only ############################# 
## Require IPsec for all IP communication 
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P out ipsec 
## esp/transport//require; 
## 
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P in ipsec 
## esp/transport//require; 
 
 
########## Security Policies - AH+ESP ############################### 
## Require IPsec for all IP communication 
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P out ipsec 
## esp/transport//require 
## ah/transport//require; 
## 
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P in ipsec 
## esp/transport//require 
## ah/transport//require; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guide: 
http: / / p laverst age. sourceforge .net / wiki / Cross Corn pile P la '.rer >vit h 0 pen ern bedded and B i 
tBake 
1) On the development laptop: 
2) Create the following folder: /overo-oe/org.openembedclecl.clev/recipes/player 
J) Save the follmving as /overo-oe/ org.openembeclcled.clev/recipes/ player/ player.bb 
(rviodified from the Guide) 
DESCTUPTTON ''Cro,.>-pla.tti.mll robot device i11tcrhu:c "''d ~crvcr'' 
LICE::\SE = ''GPLv2+ anrl LGPLv2-'' 
H01IEPAGE = ''hUp:, / play!'rstagc.sonrceforge.nd'' 
DEb' E.:\ US ''lihtool" 
b'N ''player'' 
b'V :L0.2 
PR 11 r0'' 
STtC URI "ht.tp:/ /iwcb.dl.soun:cfurgc.nct./prujcct/pla.ycr~tagc/Pl"ycr, ${PV} /ph1ycr-${PV} .t<~r .g,,'' 
SR.C _ URllmrlGs11ml = "lll2bG!'a02kcGbfd!:U;;l/HfJH20lfi7rlh'' 
S=''S{WORKDlR} / playcd{PV}'' 
inherit pkgcon±ig 
do configure () { 
c111nkc -DC'.IAKE INSTALL PREFTX /u~r -DBUTLD EXA!vfPLES OTT -DBUTLD DOCU'.TENTATTO'\ OFF-
DDULD _EXA:'viPLES=<WF -DDUlLD _PLAYERCC=<WF -DDULD _PLAYERCC _DOOST=OFF. 
-DDUILD PYTHONC DlNDl::\GS=<WF -DDULD SHARED LlDS=OFF -DDUlLD CTILS=OFF -
- - - -
Dl3llLD U'1LLS LOCSb'UTTEil OFF -Dl3UlLD lTLLS PLAYEHCA:"vl OFF - - - -
-Dl3ULLD UTLLS b'LAYEJUOY OFF -Dl3ULD UTLLS PLAYEHNAV OFF -Dl3ULD lTLLS PLAYEHPIUNT OFb" - - - - - -
-Dl3ULLD UTLLS b'LAYEJWI!OP OFF -Dl3UlLD UTLLS b'LAYEHV CWF \ - - - -
-DBUTLD CTTLS PTAYETtVCR OFF -DBUTLD UTTLS PLi\ YETtWTUTR\Tt\ P OFF -DBUTLD UTTLS Pl\fi\ P OFF-
DBCTLD CTTT.S XMI\fS OFF -DR'\i\BLR DTUVRTt ACCRL Ci\LTB OFF 
-DE::\ADLE DRJVER ACRJ20U=OFF -DENADLE DRIVER ACTS=<WF -DENADLE DRIVER. AIOTOSONAR=<WF 
- - - - -
-DE::\ADLE DRIVER ALSA=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER AMCL=<WF 
- - -
-DK\Al3LE DIU VEil AMTEC:"vlG OFF -DENAULE DIUVEH AMTECPO\VEI1Cll3E OFF-- - - -
DEJ\Al3LE DHlVEH AODV OFF -DE.:\Al3LE DHlVEH AHTOOLKLTPLUS OFF-- - - -
DENAilLE DHlVEH l3L0l3TODLO OFF' - -
-DE'\i\BLE DTUVETt BLOBTTtJ\CKER OFF -DENi\BLE DTUVETt BUMPER2Li\SETt OFF-
DENi\BLE DTUVF.H BUlVfPETtS t\FE OFF -DENi\BLE DTUVETt BUMPETtTODTO OFF-
DENADLE DRiVER CAMERAl:\!H=<WF - -
-DE::\ADLE DRIVER CAMERACOMPRESS=OFF -DE::\ADLE DRiVER CAMERAC::\C(J:\IPRESS=<WF-
- - -
DENAULE DHlVEH CAtvlEHAlVC OFF -DENAilLE DIUVEI! CAMEI!.AV4L OFF-- - - -
DENAilLE DHlVEH CAtvlEHAV4L2 OFF' - -
-DK\Al3LE DIU VEil CAMFLLTEH OFF -DENAilLE DIUVEil. CA.:\0.:\VCC4 OFF-- - - -
DENi\BLE DTUVETt CT.O])fllJSTETt OFF -DENi\BT.E DTUVER c :MDSPT.TTTETt OFF-
DENi\BLE DTUVF.H ClVfUCi\\12 OFF 
-DE::\ADLE DRlVER C:'viViSlO::'I=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER CREATE=ON -DENADLE DRIVER CVCA:.\I=<WF-
- - - - -
DEN:\BLE DTUVETt DE:\DSTOT' OFF -DEN:\HLE DTUVER DTOC\fD OFF-
DENADLE DRiVER DIODELAY=OFF ' 
-DE::\ADLE DRIVER DlOLATCH=OFF -DENADLE DRlVER DUMMY=OFF-- -
DENADLE DRIVER EEDHCO~TROLLER=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER EPCCK=<WF-- - -
DENA13LE DHlVEH EIU OFF -DENA13LE DHJVEH. EHHAT.lC OFF' - - - -
-DK\Al3LE DH..LVEH. FAKELOCALLZE OFF -DE.:\Al3LE DHlVEH FEST.lVAL OFF-
- - - -
DEN ABLE DTUVETt FLEXTPOTtT OFF -DEN ABLE DRIVER FLOCKOFFlTTtDS OFF-
DEN:\HLE DTUVF.Tt CATtCTi\ OFF • 
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-DK\ABLE DRIVER CAR\HNN\IEi\ OFF -DK\ABLE DTUVETt CBXGi\Rl'vfTNi\CT'Tt OFT'-
DENi\BLE DTUVETt GBXSTCKACFTt OFF -DEN ABLE DRIVETt SCEN:\TtTOTZE OFT'-
DEKADLE DRiVER GOTO=OFF ' - -
-DE:\ADLE DRJVER GRlDl\IAP=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER GRiPC:~JD=<WF -- - - -
DENA13LE_DHlVEH_UOKlYO_AlST OFF -DENA13LE_DIUVE11_UvlACESEQ OFF-
DENA13LE DHlVEH l.\llll3lTOH OFF\ - -
-DK\ABLE DTUVF:Tt TNSTDEM:mu OFT' -DENi\BLE DTUVETt TSK\SE OFF -DENi\BLE DTUVETt TWSPY OFF-
DENi\BLE DTUVETt Ki\TtTOWTUTETt OFT' -DENi\BLE DTUVETt KHEPER:\ OFT'' 
-DEN ABLE DRIVER Li\SERBi\Tt OFT' -DEN ABLE DTUVER L:\SERBi\TtCODE OFF-
DENADLE DRlVER LASERCSPACE=OFF -DE:\ADLE DRiVER LASERCUTTEH=<WF -- - - -
DENADLE DRiVER LASERPOSEi:\TERPOLATOR=OFF ' - -
-DK\Al3LE DHJVEH. LASE11PTZCLOUD OFF -DE.\Al3LE DHLVEH LASEHHESCAN OFF-
- - - -
DENADLE DRiVER LASERSAFE=OFF -DENADLE DRJVER LASERTORANGER=<WF-- - - -
DENA13LE DIUVEH LASEHVLSlAL13AI1CODE OFF \ - -
-DK\Al3LE DIUVEit LASEHVlSUAL13\V OFF -DENA13LE DIUVEH LlNUX.JOYSTLCL< OFF-- - - -
DENA13LE DIU VEil. LlNlXWWl OFb' -DE.\Al3LE DHlVEH LOCAL1313 OFF-- - - -
DENABLE DTUVETt Mi\PCSPMcE OFF 
-DE'\ABLE DRIVETt \lt\PFTLE OFF -DEN ABLE DRIVETt \1!\PSCM.E OFF -DE'\i\BLE DTUVETt MBTCP OFF-
DENADLE DRiVER MiCA2=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER lvllCROSTRAlN=<WF-- - - -
DENADLE DRiVER 1\IOTlON:'vil:\D=OFF ' - -
-DK\Al3LE DIU VEil IVUUCb' OFb' -DE.\Al3LE DHlVEH .\D OFF -DE.\Al3LE DHlVEH .\lMU OFF-- - - - -
DENA13LE DHlVEH .\OMAD OFF -DENA13LE DIUVE11. 0130T OFF-- - - -
DENA13LE DHlVEH OCEANSEHVEH OFF - -
-DE'\1\BLE DRIVETt P20S OFF -DK\i\FlLE DTUVETt Pi\SSTHTWUCH OFT'-
DEN ABLE DTUVETt PFlSLi\SETt OFF -DE'\i\BLE DTUVETt PHTDCETi\CC OFF-
DENADLE DRiVER PHlDGETlFK=OFF ' - -
-DE:\ADLE DRJVER PHlDGETRFlD=<WF -DENADLE DRJVER PORT10=0FF-
- - - -
DENADLE DRlVER POSTGlS=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER PTU'i6=<WF-- - - -
DENA13LE DIUVEI1. 11A.\CEI1POSELN'L'EI1POLA't0H OFb' - -
-DK\Al3LE DIU VEil HANCEWL'ODLO CWF -DE.\Al3LE DHlVEH I!ANCEHTOLASEH OFF-- - - -
DEN ABLE DTUVETt TtCORE XBTUDCE OFT' -DEN ABLE DRIVER READLOC OFF-
DEN i\ BLE DTUVETt TtEB OFF ' 
-DE:\ADLE _ DRJVER_ RELAY =OFF -DENADLE_ DRlVER_ RFLEX=OFF -DENADLE _ DRlVER_ RODOTEQ=<WF -
DENADLE DRiVER RODOTlNO=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER RODOTRACKER=<WF ' - - - -
-DE:\ADLE DRJVER ROOJ\IDA=OFF -DENADLE DRJVER RS11LEUZE=<WF -DE:\ADLE DRlVER RT:IXXX=OFF 
- - - - - -
-DK\Al3LE DIUVEI! SEC\VAYI1.\U' OFF -DENA13LE DIUVEH SEC\VAYHMP400 OFF - - - -
-DK\Al3LE DIUVEH SEIUALS'l'HEAM OFF -DENA13LE DIUVEH SEIUO OFF-- - - -
DENi\BLE DTUVETt SERVICE i\DV MD'\S OFT' -DEN ABLE DRIVER SHAPETTL\CKETt OFF-
DEN i\ BLE DTUVP.Tt STCKLmvmS OFT' 
-DE:\ADLE DRJVER SlCKL!viS200=<WF -DE:\ADLE DRJVER SlCKL!viSJOO=OFF -
- - -
DENADLE DRiVER SiCK:\AV200=<WF -DE:\ADLE DRJVER SlCKRFl:Hl=<WF-- - - -
DENADLE DRiVER SiCKS:IOOO=OFF - -
-DK\ADLE DIUVEH Sl\lPLESllAPE OFF -DENA13LE DIUVEH Sl<YETEKIVLl OFb' -- - - -
DENA13LE DIU VEil. SND OFF -DENA13LE DIUVEI1. SO.\AHTOHANCEH OFF-- - - -
DEN i\ BLE DTUVETt SO'\YEVTD:>ou OFT' ' 
-DE'\i\BLE DTUVER SPHERE OFF -DENi\BLE DTUVETt SPHEREPTZ OFF-
DENADLE DRlVER SPHiNX2=0FF -DENADLE DRJVER SR\OOO=OFF -DENADLE DRlVER STALLTODlO=<WF - - - -
-DE:\ADLE DRJVER STATGRAD=<WF 
- -
-DE:\ADLE DRJVER STOC=OFF -DENADLE DRJVER SUPPRESSOR=<WF -
- - - -
DENADLE DRlVER SWlSSRANGER=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER TCPSTREAM=<WF-- - - -
DENADLE DRlVER UNlCAPL'viAGE=<WF - -
-DK\Al3LE DJUVEH. lPC13AH.CODE OFF -DE.\Al3LE DHlVEH VEC2.MAP OFb'-
- - - -
DENA13LE DIU VEil VELCIVLD OFb' -DENA13LE DHJVEH. VFU OFF -DE.\Al3LE DHlVEH V.LDEOCA.\NY OFb' \ 
- - - - -
-DE'\ABLE DTUVETt VMAPT'TLE OFF -DE'\i\BLE DTUVETt WAVEFRONT OFF-
DENi\BLE DTUVETt WBWJ14 OFF -DEN ABLE DTUVETt WRITELOC OFF -DE'\ABLE DRIVER XSENSIVfT OFF 
-DE:\ADLE DRlVER YARPiMAGE=OFF -DE:\ADLE DRiVER SPEECHCl\lD=OFF-- - - -
DENADLE DRiVER CAMERAGST=OFF. - -
} 
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EPS05100
Regulated
AC to DC Converter
5VDC @ 1AGumstix Overo Earth
DB-25 Male
(25) Gnd
(10) +15V
(2) Serial –
(1) Serial +
R1: 0.1Ω
10W
Note: Per the NI USB-6008 User 
Guide, no AI channel can have 
more than +10V applied to it.
AI Input Impedence: 144kΩ
+/- 1V Diff Mode
+/- 10V Diff Mode
NI
USB-6008 DAQ
USB
(4)   GND
(3)   AI 4  (AI 0-)
(2)   AI 0  (AI 0+)
(1)   GND
(8)   AI 2
(7)   GND
(6)   AI 5  (AI 1-)
(5)   AI 1  (AI 1+)
(12) AI 7
(11) AI 3
(10) GND
(9)   AI 6
(16) GND
(15) AO 1
(14) AO 0
(13) GND
P0.3 (20)
P0.2 (19)
P0.1 (18)
P0.0 (17)
P0.7 (24)
P0.6 (23)
P0.5 (22)
P0.4 (21)
P1.3 (28)
P1.2 (27)
P1.1 (26)
P1.0 (25)
GND (32)
+5V (31)
+2.5V (30)
PFI 0 (29)
Wagan Tech
MTR72DAUL-1250A
AC to DC Converter
14VDC @ 5A
Gnd
+14V
Gnd
+5V
Ext Power
Gnd
+5V
iRobot Create 4400
DB-25 Fem
Battery – (25)
 Battery + (10)
Serial – (2)
Serial + (1)
Battery –
Battery +
Battery – Charge
Power Monitor
Dell Latitude E6510
Windows 7 SP1 64-bit
NI LabVIEW 9.0.1 32-bit
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Appendix E: Lab VIEW Virtual Instrument for Power Monitor 
Tab Control !Voltage Measuring Analog Input Task! 
~ custom scale na 
error in 
• input t erminal c 
• maximum value 
• minimum value 
• name to assign 
• physical channe 
task in 
units 
error out 
task out 
IAI Voltage ~~ 
I c apture Data for a set amount of time I 
I c urrent Measuring Analog Input Task I 
• custom scale na 
error in 
• input terminal c 
• maximum value 
• minimum value 
• nam e to assign 
•physical channe 
task in 
units 
error out 
task out 
•external shunt rE 
• shunt resistor lo 
IAI Current ~~ 
lO:l 
'' ' 
Vin Chart 
Pin Chart 
ITime Stamp I 
~--
Log data to Comma Separated 
Values (CSV) file. 
l D data 
Appendix F: Data Tables 
Factor Levcl1-1: Dcfense=Nonc; Exploit=Passive Sniffing 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ket•vork Load ~ehvork Load 
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%) \V) (packets) Bytes) (Kbps) 
l 1 :1.462 2.114 3784 :1Fi572G JEi.Ei726 
2 1 :L1H 2.145 3790 :3FiG2GO :35.G26 
;) 1 :1.028 2.Hi0 3773 :3Fi4720 :3Fi.472 
4 1 :3.267 2.145 3781 355478 35.5478 
5 1 :1.2i'i6 2.147 3820 :1.l9080 :15.908 
Factor Levels: Defense=Kone; Exploit=ARP Cache Poisoning 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets K et>vor k Load ~ehvork Load 
Replication lrsuccesses l: Failure 0) %) W) If packets) I3ytes) Kbps) 
1 1 :3.82"1 2.146 7469 705026 70.5026 
2 1 '3 T"' • . o't 2.152 74:38 701740 70.174 
3 1 :3.205 2.144 7470 705092 70.i5092 
4 1 :U16 2.H'l1 7406 699228 69.9228 
5 1 5.0."i.l 2.122 747:1 705622 7(L":iG22 
Factor Levels: Defense Kone: Exploit TCP Connection Hijacking 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage A '.rerage Power Packets Kctwork Load ~etwork Load 
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) cy;:.,) W) lr packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 1 96.296 2.:319 1:3617:3( 89874756 8987.4756 
2 0 94.741 2. :1F)0 1:3G94:3t 9o:38:3,)10 9o:38.:351 
:3 1 97.007 2.:12:1 1:348911 89028798 8902.8798 
4 1 94.829 2.350 138989£ 91734298 9173.4298 
5 1 95.408 2.321 136212Z 89900814 8990.0814 
Factor Levels: Dcfeni-ic=Konc; Exploit=TCP Rc1-1ct 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ket\vork Load ~etwork Load 
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%) W) (packets) Bytes) (Kbps) 
1 1 :1.o:39 2.12:1 17 1402 0.1402 
2 1 2.965 2.149 15 1190 0.119 
:3 1 :3.132 2.157 25 21:30 0.213 
4 1 2.680 2.153 15 1190 0.119 
5 1 2.711 2.158 15 1190 0.119 
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Factor Levels: Defense Kane: Exploit TCP Connection Flooding 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ketvmrk Load :.Jehvork Load 
Replication Succcsses=1: Failure=O) <;.{.) W) If packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 1 41.42( 2.228 1:3702 1057i564 10i5.7564 
2 1 :m.499 2.206 l:H9i5 1027288 102.7288 
;) 1 40.406 2.2:34 13fiG6 104799G 104. 799G 
4 1 40.471 2. 2:);) 13242 1028818 102.8818 
5 1 38.990 2.211 13369 1038380 103.8:38 
Factor Luvcls: Dcfcnse=lPscc AH; Exploit=Pa.ssive Sniffing 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage A '.rera.ge Power Packets Kctwork Load :.Jet work Load 
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%) W) (packets) Bytes) (Kbps) 
1 1 :1.541 2.140 ;)800 448400 44.84 
2 1 :1.511 2.148 3791 447402 44.7402 
:3 1 :3.201 2.151 3820 450760 45.076 
4 1 :3.580 2.149 3781 446130 44.613 
5 1 :3.145 2.120 :380i) 448955 44.895i5 
Factor Levels: Defense=IPsec AH; Exploit=ARP Cache Poisoning 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ketwork Load :.Jet work Load 
Replication (Successes 1: Failure 0) (%) (vV) (packets) (I3ytes) (Kbps) 
1 0 :3.961 2.154 48 4832 0.4832 
2 0 2.794 2.123 44 4592 0.4592 
3 0 2.765 2.157 52 5072 O.i5072 
4 0 2.805 2.151 50 4952 0.4952 
5 0 :Ui'll 2.U),) 52 ;)072 ().;)072 
Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH: Exploit TCP Connection Hijacking 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets K etwor k Load :.Jehvork Load 
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) cy;: .  ) W) If packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 0 :3.5:32 2.14i5 i5487 626951 62.6951 
2 0 :1.5:37 2.L~O 7ri88 849844 84.9844 
:1 0 :1.702 2.116 7612 8.1)2648 8;).2648 
4 0 :1.:3,)8 2.14;) 7.1)8;) 849222 84.9222 
5 0 :3.:375 2.147 7558 846684 84.6684 
10,1) 
Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH; Exploit TCP Reset 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ketvmrk Load :.Jehvork Load 
Replication Succcsses=1: Failure=O) <;.{.) W) If packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 0 :3.296 2.14i5 82:3:3 7~l2986 79.2986 
2 0 :3.:365 2.14i5 827i5 7~l7062 79.7062 
;) 0 :1.269 2.14Ei 8186 788508 78.8Fi08 
4 0 :LEifi 2.11:3 8212 79093G 79.09;)6 
5 0 :3.:343 2.143 8240 79:3696 79.3696 
Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH; Exploit TCP Connection Flooding 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage A '.rera.ge Power Packets Ketwork Load :.Jet work Load 
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) !)(·.) W) If packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 0 :3.571 2.119 10;3:38 8;39900 83.99 
2 0 :1.447 2.147 10:394 84:1660 84.:3G6 
:1 0 :1.422 2.147 10:35i) 841:1Fi0 84.Ui'i 
4 0 :1.584 2.L~O 10:322 8:39170 8:Un7 
5 0 :3.755 2.118 103:33 838762 83.8762 
Factor Levels: Dcfensc=lPsec ESP; Exploit=Passive Sniffing 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ket\vork Load :.Jet work Load 
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%) W) (packets) Bytes) (Kbps) 
1 0 :1.5i'i2 2.161 :3782 491692 49.1692 
2 0 :3.939 2.164 3770 490100 49.01 
:3 0 :3.226 2.167 3785 491994 49.1994 
4 0 :3.1:5;3 2.16i5 :3800 494000 49.4 
5 0 :3.197 2.1;)8 :381i5 495622 49.i5622 
Factor Levels: Defem:;e=IPsec ESP; Exploit=ARP Cache Poifloning 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets K et>vor k Load :.Jehvork Load 
Replication (Successes 1: Failure 0) (%) (vV) (packets) (I3ytes) (Kbps) 
1 0 5.75"1 2.166 7580 983168 98.3168 
2 0 5.:39;3 2.167 7671 995126 99.i5126 
3 0 :3.664 2.169 7557 980618 98.0618 
4 0 4.024 2.1:34 7ri99 98G190 98.619 
5 0 :3.865 2.171 7591 985054 98.i5054 
10{) 
Factor Levels: Defense IPsec ESP; Exploit TCP Connection Hijacking 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ketvmrk Load :.Jehvork Load 
Replication Succcsses=1: Failure=O) <;.{.) W) If packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 0 :3.271 2.169 :3801 4~)4186 49.4186 
2 0 :3.221 2.170 :3778 4~l1020 49.102 
;) 0 :1.447 2.1:37 3790 492700 49.27 
4 0 :1.068 2.142 3820 49G600 49.G6 
5 0 :3.068 2.138 3767 489718 48.9718 
Factor Levels: Defense IPsec ESP; Exploit TCP Reset 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage A '.rera.ge Power Packets Ketwork Load :.Jet work Load 
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) !)(·.) W) If packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 0 :3.688 2.L39 :3791 492886 49.2886 
2 0 :1.248 2.1:36 :3792 492992 49.2992 
;) 0 :U87 2.1:38 :3777 491018 49.1018 
4 0 :1.:316 2.140 :3771 49028G 49Jl286 
5 0 4.143 2.139 3772 490392 49.0392 
Factor Levels: Defcnse=lPscc ESP; Exploit=TCP Connection Flooding 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ket\vork Load :.Jet work Load 
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%) W) (packets) Bytes) (Kbps) 
1 0 :1.994 2.140 108:18 91G980 91.698 
2 0 :3.562 2.138 106:33 901180 90.118 
:3 0 :3.732 2.135 10704 908646 90.8646 
4 0 4.84;1 2.168 10(19:3 9082:14 90.82:34 
5 0 :3.70( 2.16i5 10691 905654 90.i5654 
Factor Levels: Defense=IPsee AH+ESP; Exploit.=Pa...:;sive Sniffing 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets K et>vor k Load :.Jehvork Load 
Replication (Successes 1: Failure 0) (%) (vV) (packets) (13ytes) (Kbps) 
1 0 :3.670 2.152 3798 584692 58.4692 
2 0 :3.92;1 2.124 :3802 i585i540 i58.554 
:3 0 :3.9:35 2.154 :3777 i58Hi66 58.Hi66 
4 0 :Ui84 2.H'l6 :3801 i'i85410 i'i8J)41 
5 0 :3.701 2.15:3 :3806 i586156 58.6156 
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Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH I ESP: Exploit ARP Cache Poisoning 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ketvmrk Load :.Jehvork Load 
Replication Succcsses=1: Failure=O) <;.{.) W) If packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 0 :3.874 2.12:3 7544 1159768 11i5.9768 
2 0 4.1:38 2.152 761:3 1170188 117.0188 
;) 0 :1.937 2.Hi:1 7fi84 1Hl5800 116.58 
4 0 4.087 2.127 7fi88 11t161GO llG.G16 
5 0 4.280 2.125 7569 116:3418 116.3418 
Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH I ESP; Exploit TCP Connection Hijacking 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage A '.rera.ge Power Packets Ketwork Load :.Jet work Load 
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) !)(·.) W) If packets) Bytes) Kbps) 
1 0 4.1:35 2.15i5 :3811 i586950 i58.69i5 
2 0 4.1:32 2.149 :HG1 i'i79170 i'i7.917 
:3 0 4.1:32 2.Hi0 :3801 i'i85410 i'i8Ji41 
4 0 :1.86( 2.L~1 :3801 i'i85410 i'i8Ji41 
5 0 :3.972 2.151 3791 583870 58.387 
Factor Levels: Dcfensc=lPsec AH-ESP; Exploit=TCP Reset 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ket\vork Load :.Jet work Load 
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%) W) (packets) Bytes) (Kbps) 
1 0 :1.7:32 2.119 :3781 i'i82:3:30 i'i8.2:t3 
2 0 4.:311 2.149 3771 580790 58.079 
:3 0 :3.756 2.153 3762 579380 57.938 
4 0 :3.6:3( 2.15:3 :3796 i584i584 58.4584 
5 0 :3.878 2.147 :3786 i58:3044 58.:3044 
Factor Levels: Defense=IPsec AH-ESP; Exploit=TCP Connection Flooding 
Exploit Outcome Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets K et>vor k Load :.Jehvork Load 
Replication (Successes 1: Failure 0) (%) (vV) (packets) (I3ytes) (Kbps) 
1 0 4.143 2.127 10241 969539 96.9539 
2 0 4.172 2.149 10409 980870 98.087 
3 0 5.25;:! 2.120 10215 967694 96.7694 
4 0 :1.9i'i2 2.L~2 l04Gl 9854rifi 98.i'i456 
5 0 4.099 2.12:3 10294 972960 97.296 
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